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La RSE comme instrument de la gouvernance d'entreprise

  • Cécile Cézanne


    (CEPN - Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord - Université Paris 13 - Université Sorbonne Paris Cité (USPC) - CNRS)

  • Marianne Rubinstein


    (CEPN - Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord - Université Paris 13 - Université Sorbonne Paris Cité (USPC) - CNRS)

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    After having stressed corporate governance matters raised by the "new firm", which is vertically disintegrated and intensive in specific human capital, we advance that corporate social responsibility (CSR) can be useful to regulate power relationships between key productive partners of the firm. Based on the analysis of official reports of the four major French mobile phone operators, we show that CSR is voluntarily used by firms to durably ensure wealth-creative employment and subcontracting relationships, by developing formal and informal methods.

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    Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-00628645.

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    Date of creation: 08 Nov 2010
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00628645
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