IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-00628650.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Un modèle renouvelé de gouvernance d'entreprise : une évaluation empirique sur données françaises

Author

Listed:
  • Cécile Cézanne

    (CEPN - Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord - UP13 - Université Paris 13 - USPC - Université Sorbonne Paris Cité - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This article has a dual purpose. On the one hand, it proposes a renewed analysis of the governance of specific human capital-intensive firms. On the other hand, it empirically estimates the nature of the corresponding operational model in France at the beginning of the 2000s. Actually, for nearly two decades, the firm has changed, especially with the growing importance of human capital in the value creation process. This evolution raises questions about the necessity to revisit firm governance. Considering that the very first mission of a large number of firms is to retain and to accumulate specific skills, we propose that a composite model that we call the "multi-resource" model offirm governance has to be outlined. Firstly, we analytically show that this latter aims at motivating key partners at work through the simultaneous use of individualized incentive tools and horizontal coordinative mechanisms. Secondly, we give an original empirical exploitation of the "Employer" part of the REPONSE 2004-2005 survey to test the hypothesis that such a governance system is implemented by some French firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Cécile Cézanne, 2010. "Un modèle renouvelé de gouvernance d'entreprise : une évaluation empirique sur données françaises," Post-Print hal-00628650, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00628650
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00628650
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hal.science/hal-00628650/document
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
    2. Jean Tirole & Roland Bénabou, 2006. "Incentives and Prosocial Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1652-1678, December.
    3. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    4. Séverine Lemière & Corinne Perraudin & Héloïse Petit, 2006. "Les pratiques de gestion du travail et de l'emploi en France et leurs conséquences sur les salariés," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00270952, HAL.
    5. Oyer, Paul & Schaefer, Scott, 2005. "Why do some firms give stock options to all employees?: An empirical examination of alternative theories," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 99-133, April.
    6. Nathalie Greenan & Jacques Mairesse, 2006. "Les changements organisationnels, l'informatisation des entreprises et le travail des salariés. Un exercice de mesure à partir de données couplées entreprises/salariés," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 57(6), pages 1137-1175.
    7. Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, 2003. "The Trouble with Stock Options," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 49-70, Summer.
    8. Bernard Guilhon, 2004. "Markets for knowledge: problems, scope, and economic implications," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(2), pages 165-181.
    9. Raghuram G. Rajan & Julie Wulf, 2006. "The Flattening Firm: Evidence from Panel Data on the Changing Nature of Corporate Hierarchies," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 88(4), pages 759-773, November.
    10. repec:dau:papers:123456789/10093 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Philippe Askenazy, 2005. "Sur les sources de l'intensification," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 56(2), pages 217-236.
    12. Gibbons, Robert, 2005. "Four forma(lizable) theories of the firm?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 200-245, October.
    13. Heli C. Wang & Jinyu He & Joseph T. Mahoney, 2009. "Firm‐specific knowledge resources and competitive advantage: the roles of economic‐ and relationship‐based employee governance mechanisms," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(12), pages 1265-1285, December.
    14. Suzanne Konzelmann & Neil Conway & Linda Trenberth & Frank Wilkinson, 2006. "Corporate Governance and Human Resource Management," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 44(3), pages 541-567, September.
    15. Core, John E. & Guay, Wayne R., 2001. "Stock option plans for non-executive employees," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 253-287, August.
    16. Bengt Holmstrom & John Roberts, 1998. "The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 73-94, Fall.
    17. Isabelle Huault & V. Perret & S. Charreire-Petit, 2007. "Management," Post-Print halshs-00337676, HAL.
    18. Eve Caroli & John Van Reenen, 2001. "Skill-Biased Organizational Change? Evidence from A Panel of British and French Establishments," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 116(4), pages 1449-1492.
    19. Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, 2003. "The Trouble with Stock Options," NBER Working Papers 9784, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    21. Francis Green, 2002. "Why Has Work Effort Become More Intense?," Studies in Economics 0207, School of Economics, University of Kent.
    22. Johnson, Joanne & Baldwin, John R., 1995. "Developpement du capital humain et innovation : la formation dans les petites et moyennes entreprises," Direction des études analytiques : documents de recherche 1995074f, Statistics Canada, Direction des études analytiques.
    23. Nile W. Hatch & Jeffrey H. Dyer, 2004. "Human capital and learning as a source of sustainable competitive advantage," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(12), pages 1155-1178, December.
    24. Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss & Xosé H. Vázquez, 2006. "'Tying the manager's hands': constraining opportunistic managerial intervention," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 30(5), pages 797-818, September.
    25. Murphy, Kevin J., 2003. "Stock-based pay in new economy firms," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1-3), pages 129-147, January.
    26. Oliver Gottschalg & Maurizio Zollo, 2007. "Interest Alignment and Competitive Advantage," Post-Print hal-00459446, HAL.
    27. Gérard Charreaux, 2002. "Variation sur le thème:"À la recherche de nouvelles fondations pour la finance et la gouvernance d'entreprise"," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 5(3), pages 5-68, September.
    28. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1998. "The Governance of the New Enterprise," CRSP working papers 487, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
    29. Cecile Cezanne-Sintes, 2008. "Modern corporate changes: reinstating the link between the nature, boundaries and governance of the firm," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(4), pages 447-461.
    30. Monique Le Guen & Corinne Jaffeux, 1989. "La conjonction Analyse de Données et Statistique inférentielle pour conduire à une meilleure perception visuelle," Post-Print halshs-00288556, HAL.
    31. Jean-Paul Pollin, 2004. "A propos de quelques ouvrages sur la gouvernance des entreprises," Post-Print halshs-00287715, HAL.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Cécile Cézanne & Marianne Rubinstein, 2010. "La RSE comme instrument de la gouvernance d'entreprise," Post-Print hal-00628645, HAL.
    2. Cecile Cezanne-Sintes, 2008. "Modern corporate changes: reinstating the link between the nature, boundaries and governance of the firm," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(4), pages 447-461.
    3. Cécile CEZANNE & Laurence SAGLIETTO, 2014. "Human Capital-Intensive Firms and Symbolic Value Creation," Timisoara Journal of Economics and Business, West University of Timisoara, Romania, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, vol. 7(1), pages 70-88.
    4. Cézanne, Cécile & Rubinstein, Marianne, 2012. "La RSE comme instrument de gouvernance d’entreprise : une application à l’industrie française des télécommunications," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 12.
    5. Matthias Kiefer & Edward Jones & Andrew Adams, 2016. "Principals, Agents and Incomplete Contracts: Are Surrender of Control and Renegotiation the Solution?," CFI Discussion Papers 1603, Centre for Finance and Investment, Heriot Watt University.
    6. Gérard Charreaux, 2002. "Variation sur le thème:"À la recherche de nouvelles fondations pour la finance et la gouvernance d'entreprise"," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 5(3), pages 5-68, September.
    7. Bernard Baudry & Virgile Chassagnon, 2012. "The vertical network organization as a specific governance structure: what are the challenges for incomplete contracts theories and what are the theoretical implications for the boundaries of the (hub," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 16(2), pages 285-303, May.
    8. Cécile Cézanne & Olivier Sautel, 2007. "Firme intensive en capital humain et coordination : vers une redéfinition du rapport entre intégration et dé-intégration," Post-Print hal-00331454, HAL.
    9. Eduard Marinov, 2016. "The 2016 Nobel Prize in Economics," Economic Thought journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 6, pages 97-149.
    10. Nien-Chi Liu & Ming-Yuan Chen & Mei-Ling Wang, 2016. "The Effects of Non-Expensed Employee Stock Bonus on Firm Performance: Evidence from Taiwanese High-Tech Firms," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 54(1), pages 30-54, March.
    11. Hand, John R.M., 2008. "Give everyone a prize? Employee stock options in private venture-backed firms," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 385-404, July.
    12. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1998. "The Governance of the New Enterprise," CRSP working papers 487, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
    13. Hideshi Itoh, 2006. "The Theories of International Outsourcing and Integration : A Theoretical Overview from the Perspective of Organizational Economics," Microeconomics Working Papers 21891, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
    14. Oliver Gürtler, 2010. "Haggling for Rents, Relational Contracts, and the Theory of the Firm," Schmalenbach Business Review (sbr), LMU Munich School of Management, vol. 62(4), pages 359-377, October.
    15. Choe, Chongwoo & Ishiguro, Shingo, 2008. "On the (Sub)optimality of Multi-tier Hierarchies: Coordination versus Motivation," MPRA Paper 13451, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, 2004. "Compensating Employees Below the Executive Ranks: A Comparison of Options, Restricted Stock, and Cash," NBER Working Papers 10221, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Kabiraj, Tarun & Sinha, Uday Bhanu, 2016. "Strategic outsourcing with technology transfer under price competition," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 281-290.
    18. Rebitzer, James B. & Taylor, Lowell J., 2011. "Extrinsic Rewards and Intrinsic Motives: Standard and Behavioral Approaches to Agency and Labor Markets," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 8, pages 701-772, Elsevier.
    19. Luigi Zingales, 2000. "In Search of New Foundations," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(4), pages 1623-1653, August.
    20. Yaowen Shan & Terry Walter, 2016. "Towards a Set of Design Principles for Executive Compensation Contracts," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 52(4), pages 619-684, December.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00628650. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.