Un modèle renouvelé de gouvernance d'entreprise : une évaluation empirique sur données françaises
This article has a dual purpose. On the one hand, it proposes a renewed analysis of the governance of specific human capital-intensive firms. On the other hand, it empirically estimates the nature of the corresponding operational model in France at the beginning of the 2000s. Actually, for nearly two decades, the firm has changed, especially with the growing importance of human capital in the value creation process. This evolution raises questions about the necessity to revisit firm governance. Considering that the very first mission of a large number of firms is to retain and to accumulate specific skills, we propose that a composite model that we call the "multi-resource" model offirm governance has to be outlined. Firstly, we analytically show that this latter aims at motivating key partners at work through the simultaneous use of individualized incentive tools and horizontal coordinative mechanisms. Secondly, we give an original empirical exploitation of the "Employer" part of the REPONSE 2004-2005 survey to test the hypothesis that such a governance system is implemented by some French firms.
|Date of creation:||01 Aug 2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published, Revue d'Economie Politique, 2010, 120, 4, 669-700|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00628650/en/|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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