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The Firm as a Multicontact Organization

Author

Listed:
  • Laffont, J.J.
  • Martimort, D.

Abstract

The firm is often considered as a nexus of contracts linking the management and its different stakeholders: claim‐holders, workers, unions, customers, suppliers, and the state, among others. This paper surveys recent work in contract theory, the multiprincipal incentive theory, and the theory of side contracts, which provides some insights into the structure of those contracts and therefore into the structure of the firm. First, we discuss the incomplete contracting assumptions underlying these variations of the usual grand contract approach. Second, we explain how the theoretical lessons learned from this work—the distribution of contracting rights, the power of incentive schemes within organizations, and the design of communication channels—apply to the theory of the firm.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Laffont, J.J. & Martimort, D., 1996. "The Firm as a Multicontact Organization," Papers 95.390, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:gremaq:95.390
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    Cited by:

    1. Dur, Robert & Roelfsema, Hein, 2010. "Social exchange and common agency in organizations," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 55-63, January.
    2. Antoine Faure-Grimaud & Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 2000. "A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 1(2), pages 231-263, November.
    3. Esther Gal‐Or, 1997. "Multiprincipal Agency Relationships as Implied by Product Market Competition," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(1), pages 235-256, June.
    4. Michael Dietrich & Jackie Krafft & Jacques-Laurent Ravix, 2008. "Regulation and governance of the firm," Post-Print hal-00203479, HAL.
    5. Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli & Lokshin, Michael & Kolchin, Vladimir, 2023. "Effects of public sector wages on corruption: Wage inequality matters," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 941-959.
    6. Gerald A. Feltham & Christian Hofmann, 2012. "Information suppression in multi-agent contracting," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 254-278, June.
    7. Martimort David & Stole Lars, 2003. "Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-40, July.
    8. Jackie Krafft & Jacques-Laurent Ravix, 2005. "The governance of innovative firms: An evolutionary perspective," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(3), pages 125-147.
    9. Bickenbach, Frank, 1999. "Regulierung und Wettbewerb im Bereich der Netzinfrastrukturen: Begründung, Regeln und Institutionen," Kiel Working Papers 910, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
    10. Bickenbach, Frank, 2000. "Regulation of Europe's network industries: the perspective of the new economic theory of federalism," Kiel Working Papers 977, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
    11. Caroline Stiel, 2017. "Modern Public Enterprises: Organisational Innovation and Productivity," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1713, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    12. Walter A Cont, 2001. "Essays on Contract Design: Delegation and Agency Problems, and Monitoring Under Collusion," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000122, David K. Levine.
    13. Peiyao Shen & Regina Betz & Andreas Ortmann & Rukai Gong, 2020. "Improving Truthful Reporting of Polluting Firms by Rotating Inspectors: Experimental Evidence from a Bribery Game," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 76(2), pages 201-233, July.
    14. Florence Busson-Villa, 2000. "La Gestion Des Risques Dans Les Communes," Post-Print halshs-00587433, HAL.
    15. Martimort, David, 1996. "The multiprincipal nature of government," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 673-685, April.
    16. Emma Hubert, 2020. "Continuous-time incentives in hierarchies," Papers 2007.10758, arXiv.org.
    17. Yuri Gorbaneff & Sergio Torres & José Fernando Cardona, 2009. "El concepto de incentivo en administración. Una revisión de la literatura," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 11(21), pages 73-91, July-Dece.
    18. Hongbin Cai & Walter Cont, 2004. "Agency Problems and Commitment in Delegated Bargaining," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(4), pages 703-729, December.
    19. Versaevel, Bruno & de Villemeur, Étienne, 2003. "Conflict and Cooperation on R&D Markets," IDEI Working Papers 191, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    20. Milton Harris & Artur Raviv, 2002. "Organization Design," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 48(7), pages 852-865, July.
    21. Son Ku Kim & Keunkwan Ryu, 2001. "Joint Determination of Internal Organizational Design: Decision-Making, Task Allocation, and Incentive Scheme," ISER Discussion Paper 0550, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka.
    22. Faure-Grimaud Antoine & Laffont Jean-Jacques & Martimort David, 2003. "Risk Averse Supervisors and the Efficiency of Collusion," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-32, January.
    23. Stefano Dughera & Alain Marciano, 2022. "Supervise me if you can. Relational feelings, incentive pays and supervisory violations," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 136(1), pages 47-72, June.
    24. Kyung-Hye Kim & Seung-Weon Yoo & Kyong-Soo Choi, 2019. "Information Asymmetry among Multiple Principals and Inefficiency within the Organization," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(24), pages 1-14, December.
    25. Cecile Cezanne-Sintes, 2008. "Modern corporate changes: reinstating the link between the nature, boundaries and governance of the firm," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(4), pages 447-461.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
    • K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
    • M10 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - General

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