Regulation and governance of the firm
Uniformity in modes of regulation and governance is now widely debated. The predominant thesis is that there should be a superior model promoting optimality by disclosure of information and transparency. But today, this thesis is greatly contested, since the adoption of a unique and universal set of rules and arrangements neglects the diversity of national experiences and the heterogeneity of firms, institutions and social norms. Moreover, evidence shows that this unique model of regulation and governance tends to generate major failures and turbulences. What emerges as a result is that different types of rules and norms govern entrepreneurial as well as public firms in different industries and stages of their development. The special issue following this introduction aims at discussing this timely debate on uniformity versus variety of modes of regulation and governance, and especially privileges analytical and empirical contributions covering the following dimensions of the debate: new approaches on regulation and governance in the domain of economics of the firm, business strategy, law and economics; new evidence on the evolution of regulation and governance at the firm, industry, and national levels.
|Date of creation:||2008|
|Publication status:||Published in International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis (Routledge), 2008, 22 (4), pp.397-406|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00203479|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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