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The Governance of the Knowledge-Intensive Firm in an Industry Life-Cycle Approach

  • Jackie Krafft

    (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis - CNRS)

  • Jacques-Laurent Ravix

    (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis - CNRS)

Today, a growing literature develops on the idea that different types of rules and norms should govern differently entrepreneurial and public firms, depending on the industry in which they operate and the stage of development of the industry. This chapter contributes to this new literature by adding the empirical dimensions that are pointed out in the industry life cycle (ILC) literature. The purpose is to investigate what the governance of the knowledge-intensive firm may look like in an industry life cycle approach.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-00239286.

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Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Mario Morroni. Corporate Governance, Organization and the Firm, Edward Elgar, pp.48-62, 2009, New Perspectives on the Modern Corporation
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00239286
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  1. Nicolai J Foss & Jens Fr�slev Christensen, 2001. "A market-process approach to corporate coherence," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 22(4-5), pages 213-226.
  2. Rajan, Raghuram G & Zingales, Luigi, 1998. "Power in a Theory of the Firm," CEPR Discussion Papers 1777, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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  8. Jacques-Laurent Ravix, 2008. "Nature and governance of the firm: in search of an integrated perspective," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(4), pages 463-478.
  9. Jackie Krafft & Jacques-Laurent Ravix, 2008. "Corporate governance and the governance of knowledge: rethinking the relationship in terms of corporate coherence," Post-Print hal-00203550, HAL.
  10. Jackie Krafft & Jacques-Laurent Ravix, 2005. "The governance of innovative firms: An evolutionary perspective," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(3), pages 125-147.
  11. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Str�mberg, 2003. "Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(2), pages 281-315.
  12. Michael Dietrich & Jackie Krafft & Jacques-Laurent Ravix, 2008. "The governance and regulation of the firm," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(4), pages 397-405.
  13. Gompers, Paul A, 1995. " Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of Venture Capital," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(5), pages 1461-89, December.
  14. Klepper, Steven, 1997. "Industry Life Cycles," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(1), pages 145-81.
  15. Jackie Krafft & Jacques-Laurent Ravix, 2008. "The firm and its governance along the industry life cycle," Post-Print hal-00211206, HAL.
  16. repec:oup:qjecon:v:113:y:1998:i:2:p:387-432 is not listed on IDEAS
  17. Marco Becht, 2005. "Corporate Governance: An Assessment," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 155-163, Summer.
  18. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," NBER Working Papers 5554, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  19. Gompers, Paul A., 1996. "Grandstanding in the venture capital industry," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 133-156, September.
  20. Audretsch, David B & Lehmann, Erik E, 2005. "Entrepreneurial Access and Absorption of Knowledge Spillovers: Strategic Board and Managerial Composition for Competitive Advantage," CEPR Discussion Papers 5335, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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