The governance of innovative firms: An evolutionary perspective
Corporate governance has been in the recent years one of the most debated issues in conventional economic approaches. Agency theory combined with financial indicators has particularly contributed to the development of shareholder value as a key concept in companies' governance both at a theoretical and empirical level. We argue that an evolutionary perspective can be developed on the governance of innovative firms since (1) conventional economic approaches only consider a restricted part of this complex issue, and (2) this restricted vision applied in practice has driven the economic system into major coordination problems and turbulences. On the basis of empirical investigations into the telecommunications industry, and guided by a simple model of evolutionary game, we propose new principles of corporate governance centered upon managerial entrepreneurship and its role on innovation and industry dynamics. The outcome is a set of rules of conduct for the manager and the shareholder.
Volume (Year): 14 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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