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El concepto de incentivo en administración. Una revisión de la literatura

Author

Listed:
  • Yuri Gorbaneff

    (Pontificia Universidad Javeriana)

  • Sergio Torres

    (Pontificia Universidad Javeriana)

  • José Fernando Cardona

    (Pontificia Universidad Javeriana)

Abstract

The paper reviews and discusses the literature on the concept of incentive in management; the visions of ancient Greek philosophers, classical economists, scientific management, agency theory, contracts, property theory and transaction costs theory. The discussion shows that the transaction costs theory, with its central idea of forms of governance, constitutes a comprehensive view of incentives that explains what are the inexplicable paradoxes for other theoretical perspectives. The paper analyzes the relations between incentives and helps to build up a theoretical and useful formal model of incentives.

Suggested Citation

  • Yuri Gorbaneff & Sergio Torres & José Fernando Cardona, 2009. "El concepto de incentivo en administración. Una revisión de la literatura," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 11(21), pages 73-91, July-Dece.
    • Handle: RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:11:y:2009:i:21:p:73-91
    as

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    File URL: http://www.uexternado.edu.co/facecono/ecoinstitucional/workingpapers/ygorbaneff21.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    incentive; governance form; transaction costs;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights

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