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El concepto de incentivo en administración. Una revisión de la literatura

Author

Listed:
  • Yuri Gorbaneff

    () (Pontificia Universidad Javeriana)

  • Sergio Torres

    () (Pontificia Universidad Javeriana)

  • José Fernando Cardona

    () (Pontificia Universidad Javeriana)

Abstract

The paper reviews and discusses the literature on the concept of incentive in management; the visions of ancient Greek philosophers, classical economists, scientific management, agency theory, contracts, property theory and transaction costs theory. The discussion shows that the transaction costs theory, with its central idea of forms of governance, constitutes a comprehensive view of incentives that explains what are the inexplicable paradoxes for other theoretical perspectives. The paper analyzes the relations between incentives and helps to build up a theoretical and useful formal model of incentives.

Suggested Citation

  • Yuri Gorbaneff & Sergio Torres & José Fernando Cardona, 2009. "El concepto de incentivo en administración. Una revisión de la literatura," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 11(21), pages 73-91, July-Dece.
  • Handle: RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:11:y:2009:i:21:p:73-91
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    File URL: http://www.uexternado.edu.co/facecono/ecoinstitucional/workingpapers/ygorbaneff21.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
    2. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    3. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Agency Problems and Residual Claims," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 327-349, June.
    4. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
    5. repec:mes:challe:v:34:y:1991:i:6:p:58-60 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Stephen Dunn, 2000. "Fundamental Uncertainty and the Firm in the Long Run," Review of Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(4), pages 419-433.
    7. Samuel Bowles, 1998. "Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 75-111, March.
    8. William G. Ouchi, 1979. "A Conceptual Framework for the Design of Organizational Control Mechanisms," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 25(9), pages 833-848, September.
    9. Ichniowski, Casey & Shaw, Kathryn & Prennushi, Giovanna, 1997. "The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(3), pages 291-313, June.
    10. George Baker & Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 2001. "Bringing the Market inside the Firm?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 212-218, May.
    11. Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1997. "The Firm as a Multicontract Organization," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(2), pages 201-234, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Leonel Arango Vásquez & Eduardo Alexander Duque Grisales & Germán Horacio Cardona Vélez, 2014. "La teoría de la agencia en la industria del capital riesgo: mecanismos de alineación de intereses," ESCENARIOS: EMPRESAS Y TERRITORIO, INSTITUCION UNIVERSITARIA ESUMER, January.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    incentive; governance form; transaction costs;

    JEL classification:

    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights

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