Social Exchange and Common Agency in Organizations
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- Dur, Robert & Roelfsema, Hein, 2010. "Social exchange and common agency in organizations," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 55-63, January.
- Robert Dur & Hein Roelfsema, 2006. "Social Exchange and Common Agency in Organizations," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-111/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 15 Oct 2008.
- Robert Dur & Hein Roelfsema, 2007. "Social Exchange and Common Agency in Organizations," CESifo Working Paper Series 2030, CESifo Group Munich.
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- Graham Mallard, 2014. "Static Common Agency And Political Influence: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 17-35, February.
- Dur, Robert & Non, Arjan & Roelfsema, Hein, 2010.
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- Robert Dur & Arjan Non & Hein Roelfsema, 2008. "Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 08-080/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Robert Dur & Arjan Non & Hein Roelfsema, 2009. "Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace," SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research 177, DIW Berlin, The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
- Dur, Robert & Non, Arjan & Roelfsema, Hein, 2010. "Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace," IZA Discussion Papers 4782, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Benedetto Gui & Luca Stanca, 2010. "Happiness and relational goods: well-being and interpersonal relations in the economic sphere," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 57(2), pages 105-118, June.
- Marco Kleine & Pascal Langenbach & Lilia Zhurakhovska, 2013. "How Voice Shapes Reactions to Impartial Decision- Makers: An Experiment on Participation Procedures," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2013_11, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, revised Feb 2017.
- repec:dau:papers:123456789/6913 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
Keywords
social exchange; reciprocity; incentive contracts; common agency; organizational design;JEL classification:
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
- M50 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - General
- M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management
- M55 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Contracting Devices
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ALL-2006-11-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-SOC-2006-11-25 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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