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Experimental labor markets and policy considerations: Incomplete contracts and macroeconomic aspects

  • Casoria Fortuna
  • Riedl Arno

    (METEOR)

This survey focuses on experimental labor markets investigating two aspects that deem us importantfor a better understanding of labor market relations and the consequences for labor marketpolicies. The first part of the survey is dedicated to papers that assess the prevalence ofreciprocal considerations in incomplete labor contracts. The second part summarizes the relativelysmall but growing experimental literature exploring labor issues in a macroeconomics and publicfinance setting and studying the interaction between taxation and labor market outcomes.

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File URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:9b82159e-8d57-4818-9a7c-f246994fe6be/datastreams/ASSET1/content
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Paper provided by Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR) in its series Research Memorandum with number 058.

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Date of creation: 2012
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Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2012058
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