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How Voice Shapes Reactions to Impartial Decision Makers: An Experiment

  • Marco Kleine

    ()

    (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn)

  • Pascal Langenbach

    ()

    (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn)

  • Lilia Zhurakhovska

    ()

    (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn)

Registered author(s):

    We study how participation in decision processes shapes people's behavior towards impartial authorities. In an incentivized laboratory experiment, an impartial decision maker at first decides about the allocation of money between two subordinates. Treatments differ in the opportunity for one subordinate to state her opinion about the allocation before the decision is made ("voice"). We elicit the subordinate's attitude towards the impartial decision maker in a subsequent dictator game. Voice substantially increases transfers in the dictator game towards the former decision maker. Average transfers are 90% higher in voice treatments than in baseline. These positive voice effects occur irrespectively of the previous allocation decision by the impartial decision maker. Our results therefore stress the positive effects of participation in decision procedures when people interact with impartial authorities.

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    Paper provided by Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods in its series Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods with number 2013_11.

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    Date of creation: Jul 2013
    Date of revision: Feb 2014
    Handle: RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2013_11
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