IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-00629124.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

An Introduction to Destructive Coordination

Author

Listed:
  • Mehrdad Vahabi

    (ERASME - Recherche et analyse des sociétés Maghreb-Europe - UP8 - Université Paris 8 Vincennes-Saint-Denis)

Abstract

Polanyi (1944, [1957] 1968) has distinguished three 'patterns of social integration,' namely 'reciprocity', 'redistribution' and 'exchange.' This triad has provided the starting point for most subsequent discussion. Our purpose is to introduce a further type of coordination, the 'destructive mode of coordination'. This mode achieves coordination by intimidation, threat, and the use of non-institutionalized coercive means. Resources and human efforts are allocated in order to appropriate what other people produce. Two simple examples provide an introductory illustration, traffic circles (roundabouts) and prisons. Appropriation through pirating provides a further example of destructive coordination. More specifically, biopiracy (blood patenting) is discussed in order to clarify the relationship between destructive coordination and the institutionalization of property rights. Finally, we focus on the role of destructive coordination as a transitional mechanism that is supported by the institutional vacuum ultimately yielding to other modes of coordination.

Suggested Citation

  • Mehrdad Vahabi, 2009. "An Introduction to Destructive Coordination," Post-Print hal-00629124, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00629124
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00629124
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hal.science/hal-00629124/document
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bush, Winston C. & Mayer, Lawrence S., 1974. "Some implications of anarchy for the distribution of property," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 401-412, August.
    2. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "A Theory of Exit in Duopoly," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 943-960, July.
    3. Peter Leeson, 2007. "Edward P. Stringham, ed., Anarchy and the Law: The Political Economy of Choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(1), pages 253-256, October.
    4. Jason Osborne, 2005. "Jungle or Just Bush? Anarchy and the Evolution of Cooperation," Chapters, in: Edward Stringham (ed.), Anarchy, State and Public Choice, chapter 3, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Kenneth J. Arrow, 1997. "Invaluable Goods," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(2), pages 757-765, June.
    6. Kornai, Janos, 1992. "The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198287766, Decembrie.
    7. Hirshleifer,Jack, 2001. "The Dark Side of the Force," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521009171, December.
    8. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2004. "The Political Economy of Destructive Power," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 3481.
    9. Vahabi, Mehrdad, 2006. "Ordres contradictoires et coordination destructive: le malaise iranien [Contradictory orders and detructive coordination: the Iranian disease]," MPRA Paper 13235, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Sep 2008.
    10. Christopher Coyne, 2005. "Social Interaction without the State," Chapters, in: Edward Stringham (ed.), Anarchy, State and Public Choice, chapter 5, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    11. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817, Decembrie.
    12. Daniel Bromley, 1992. "The commons, common property, and environmental policy," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(1), pages 1-17, January.
    13. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1981. "Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 92-100, August.
    14. Schlicht, Ekkehart, 1998. "On Custom in the Economy," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198292241, Decembrie.
    15. Edward Stringham (ed.), 2005. "Anarchy, State and Public Choice," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 3741.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2011. "The Economics of Destructive Power," Chapters, in: Derek L. Braddon & Keith Hartley (ed.), Handbook on the Economics of Conflict, chapter 5, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. repec:hal:cepnwp:hal-01583569 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Antoine Pietri, 2017. "Les modèles de « rivalité coercitive » dans l’analyse économique des conflits," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 127(3), pages 307-352.
    4. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2009. "A Critical Review of Strategic Conflict Theory and Socio-political Instability Models," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 119(6), pages 817-858.
    5. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2021. "Socialism and Kornai’s revolutionary perspective," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 187(1), pages 37-54, April.
    6. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2018. "János Kornai and General Equilibrium Theory," Acta Oeconomica, Akadémiai Kiadó, Hungary, vol. 68(supplemen), pages 27-52, January.
    7. Rui Wang & Qianmao Zhu & Matthew Noellert, 2024. "Weak central government, strong legal rights: the origins of divergent legal institutions in 18th-century Chinese and Japanese rice markets," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 11(1), pages 1-15, December.
    8. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2011. "Appropriation, violent enforcement, and transaction costs: a critical survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(1), pages 227-253, April.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Vahabi,Mehrdad, 2019. "The Political Economy of Predation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107591370, Enero.
    2. Benjamin Powell & Edward Stringham, 2009. "Public choice and the economic analysis of anarchy: a survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(3), pages 503-538, September.
    3. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2011. "Appropriation, violent enforcement, and transaction costs: a critical survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(1), pages 227-253, April.
    4. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2009. "A Critical Review of Strategic Conflict Theory and Socio-political Instability Models," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 119(6), pages 817-858.
    5. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2012. "Political Economy of Conflict Foreword," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 122(2), pages 153-169.
    6. Vahabi, Mehrdad, 2008. "Protection costs, transaction costs,and economic theory," MPRA Paper 17648, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2011. "The Economics of Destructive Power," Chapters, in: Derek L. Braddon & Keith Hartley (ed.), Handbook on the Economics of Conflict, chapter 5, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    8. Vahabi, Mehrdad, 2006. "Ordres contradictoires et coordination destructive: le malaise iranien [Contradictory orders and detructive coordination: the Iranian disease]," MPRA Paper 13235, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Sep 2008.
    9. Benjamin Powell & Edward Stringham, 2009. "Public choice and the economic analysis of anarchy: a survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(3), pages 503-538, September.
    10. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2001. "The Soft Budget Constraint: A Theoretical Clarification," Post-Print hal-00629160, HAL.
    11. Roth, M. Garrett & Skarbek, David, 2014. "Prison Gangs and the Community Responsibility System," Review of Behavioral Economics, now publishers, vol. 1(3), pages 223-243, May.
    12. Aaron Tornell, 1999. "Privatizing the Privatized," NBER Working Papers 7206, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Kaushik Basu, 2016. "Beyond the Invisible Hand: Groundwork for a New Economics," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9299.
    14. Martin Kolmar, 2007. "Goods or resource contests?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(3), pages 491-499, June.
    15. Stringham, Edward Peter & Zywicki, Todd J., 2011. "Hayekian anarchism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 78(3), pages 290-301, May.
    16. Anderton,Charles H. & Carter,John R., 2009. "Principles of Conflict Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521875578, December.
    17. Gorodnichenko, Yuriy & Grygorenko, Yegor, 2008. "Are oligarchs productive? Theory and evidence," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 17-42, March.
    18. Vahabi, Mehrdad, 2011. "Soft budget constraint and the parastatal sector," MPRA Paper 37926, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Vahabi, Mehrdad & Hassani-Mahmooei, Behrooz, 2016. "The role of identity and authority from anarchy to order: Insights from modeling the trajectory of dueling in Europe," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 57-72.
    20. Earle, John S. & Pagano, Ugo & Lesi, Maria, 2006. "Information technology, organizational form, and transition to the market," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(4), pages 471-489, August.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00629124. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.