Protection costs, transaction costs,and economic theory
Contractual reductionism takes market exchange as the ubiquitous form of economic organization throughout history. Transactions costs are accordingly regarded as the costs of running any economic system in general. This paper explores the nature of protection/aggression costs as specific costs of coordination through coercion which should be distinguished from transaction costs. Protection/aggression costs play a crucial role in deciding the frontiers between the state and firms as well as their alliance and networking. Our study shows that externalization or internalization of the state-type activities of the enterprise hinges upon the amount of protection/aggression costs compared to the sum total of tax plus transaction costs.
|Date of creation:||Sep 2008|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Williamson, Oliver E., 1999. "The Mechanisms of Governance," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195132601, April.
- Kahan, Arcadius, 1973. "Notes on Serfdom in Western and Eastern Europe," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 33(01), pages 86-99, March.
- Dahlman, Carl J, 1979. "The Problem of Externality," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(1), pages 141-162, April.
- Steven Tadelis & Oliver E.Williamson, 2012.
"Transaction Cost Economics,"
Introductory Chapters,in: Robert Gibbons & John Roberts (ed.), : The Handbook of Organizational Economics
Princeton University Press.
- Williamson, Oliver E., 1989. "Transaction cost economics," Handbook of Industrial Organization,in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 3, pages 135-182 Elsevier.
- Jayadev, Arjun & Bowles, Samuel, 2006. "Guard labor," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 328-348, April.
- Simon Kuznets, 1945. "National Product in Wartime," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number kuzn45-1, June.
- Wallis, John Joseph & North, Douglass C., 1988. "Should Transaction Costs be Subtracted from Gross National Product?," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(03), pages 651-654, September.
- Hirshleifer,Jack, 2001. "The Dark Side of the Force," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521804127, November.
- Hirshleifer,Jack, 2001. "The Dark Side of the Force," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521009171, Diciembre.
- Jack Hirshleifer, 1993. "The Dark Side of the Force," UCLA Economics Working Papers 702, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Kornai, Janos, 1992. "The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198287766, April.
- Barzel, Yoram, 1982. "Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 27-48, April.
- Mehrdad Vahabi, 2004. "The Political Economy of Destructive Power," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 3481, July.
- Schlicht, Ekkehart, 1998. "On Custom in the Economy," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198292241, April.
- Barzel, Yoram, 1977. "An Economic Analysis of Slavery," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(1), pages 87-110, April. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:17648. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.