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Bargaining and Commitment in a Permanent Relationship

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  • Holden Steinar

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Suggested Citation

  • Holden Steinar, 1994. "Bargaining and Commitment in a Permanent Relationship," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 169-176, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:7:y:1994:i:2:p:169-176
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    Cited by:

    1. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2011. "The Economics of Destructive Power," Chapters,in: Handbook on the Economics of Conflict, chapter 5 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Manzini, Paola, 1997. "Strategic wage bargaining with destructive power: the role of commitment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 15-22, January.
    3. Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2012. "Wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time under exogenous strike decisions," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 12013, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    4. repec:spr:etbull:v:3:y:2015:i:2:d:10.1007_s40505-014-0041-9 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2014. "On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 14011, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    6. Vicente Calabuig Alcantara, 1997. "Ineficiencias en las negociaciones entre dos agentes completamente informados," Working Papers. Serie EC 1997-03, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    7. Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2014. "Wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time under different strike decisions," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00975533, HAL.

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