Wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time under different strike decisions
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- Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2014. "Wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time under different strike decisions," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00975533, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2012.
"Wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time under exogenous strike decisions,"
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
12013, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2012. "Wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time under exogenous strike decisions," Post-Print halshs-00674033, HAL.
- Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2012. "Wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time under exogenous strike decisions," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00674033, HAL.
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- Harold Houba & Quan Wen, 2008. "On striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 37(3), pages 509-519, December.
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Cited by:
- Agnieszka Rusinowska & Ahmet Ozkardas, 2015.
"On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time,"
Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(2), pages 181-199, October.
- Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2014. "On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time," Post-Print halshs-00971403, HAL.
- Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2015. "On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01044870, HAL.
- Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2015. "On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-01044870, HAL.
- Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2014. "On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 14011, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2015. "On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time," Post-Print hal-01044870, HAL.
- Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2014. "On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00971403, HAL.
- Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2014.
"Holdout threats of the union during wage bargaining,"
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
14072, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2014. "Holdout threats of the union during wage bargaining," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01112402, HAL.
- Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2014. "Holdout threats of the union during wage bargaining," Post-Print halshs-01112402, HAL.
- repec:hal:pseose:hal-01241273 is not listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
union; firm bargaining; alternating offers; varying discount rates; subgame perfect equilibrium;All these keywords.
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2014-12-19 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2014-12-19 (Microeconomics)
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