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On striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents

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  • Harold Houba
  • Quan Wen

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Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Harold Houba & Quan Wen, 2008. "On striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 37(3), pages 509-519, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:37:y:2008:i:3:p:509-519
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-007-0306-8
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-007-0306-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. repec:cup:apsrev:v:97:y:2003:i:01:p:123-133_00 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475.
    4. Merlo, Antonio & Wilson, Charles A, 1995. "A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(2), pages 371-399, March.
    5. Bolt, Wilko, 1995. "Striking for a Bargain between Two Completely Informed Agents: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1344-1347, December.
    6. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Wen, Quan, 1995. "Perfect Equilibria in Negotiation Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 545-565, May.
    7. Fernandez, Raquel & Glazer, Jacob, 1991. "Striking for a Bargain between Two Completely Informed Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 240-252, March.
    8. Ehud Lehrer & Ady Pauzner, 1999. "Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(2), pages 393-412, March.
    9. Antonio Merlo & Charles Wilson, 1997. "Efficient delays in a stochastic model of bargaining," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(1), pages 39-55.
    10. Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1984. "Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1351-1364, November.
    11. Harold Houba & Gijsbert van Lomwel, 2001. "Counter intuitive results in a simple model of wage negotiations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 17(1), pages 81-99.
    12. Bewley, Truman F., 1972. "Existence of equilibria in economies with infinitely many commodities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 514-540, June.
    13. Haller, Hans & Holden, Steinar, 1990. "A letter to the editor on wage bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 232-236, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Carmona, Guilherme & Carvalho, Luís, 2016. "Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 131-138.
    2. repec:spr:etbull:v:3:y:2015:i:2:d:10.1007_s40505-014-0041-9 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2014. "Wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time under different strike decisions," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00975533, HAL.
    4. Houba, Harold & Wen, Quan, 2014. "Backward induction and unacceptable offers," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 151-156.
    5. Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2012. "Wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time under exogenous strike decisions," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 12013, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    6. Sang-Chul Suh & Quan Wen, 2009. "A multi-agent bilateral bargaining model with endogenous protocol," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 40(2), pages 203-226, August.
    7. Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2014. "Holdout threats of the union during wage bargaining," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01112402, HAL.
    8. Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2014. "Holdout threats of the union during wage bargaining," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 14072, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    9. Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2014. "On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 14011, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    10. Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2014. "Inefficient equilibria and lockouts in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 14073, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    11. Houba, Harold & Wen, Quan, 2011. "Extreme equilibria in the negotiation model with different time preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 507-516.
    12. repec:hal:journl:halshs-01112402 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bargaining; Negotiation; C72; C73; C78;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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