Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: Big Bills Left on the Sidewalk: Why Some Nations Are Rich, and Others Poor
Some research presumes that, when rational parties bargain, nothing is left on the table, so that social outcomes are efficient and leave countries on the frontiers of their aggregate production functions. A study of differences in per capita incomes across countries shows that this cannot be the case. Countries' endowments of natural and human resources do not explain any significant part of the variation in incomes and the mobility of capital assures that it is impartially available to all countries. National differences in the quality of policies and institutions across countries mainly account for differences in per capita incomes.
Volume (Year): 10 (1996)
Issue (Month): 2 (Spring)
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- Robert J. Barro, 1991.
"Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 106(2), pages 407-443.
- Barro, R.J., 1989. "Economic Growth In A Cross Section Of Countries," RCER Working Papers 201, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Robert J. Barro, 1989. "Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries," NBER Working Papers 3120, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Borjas, George J, 1987. "Self-Selection and the Earnings of Immigrants," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(4), pages 531-553, September.
- George J. Borjas, 1987. "Self-Selection and the Earnings of Immigrants," NBER Working Papers 2248, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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