Appropriation, Property Rights Institutions, and International Trade
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More about this item
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
- K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
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