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Appropriation, Property Rights Institutions, and International Trade

Author

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  • Christodoulos Stefanadis

Abstract

In producer-friendly economies—economies that are ruled by productive agents and have strong property rights institutions—international trade causes an institutional improvement and an aggregate shift of talent towards production, and away from socially wasteful appropriation. However, in predator-friendly economies—economies that are ruled by rent seekers and have weak institutions—international trade leads to an institutional deterioration, and a more unfavorable talent allocation. (JEL D72, F12, K11)

Suggested Citation

  • Christodoulos Stefanadis, 2010. "Appropriation, Property Rights Institutions, and International Trade," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 148-172, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejpol:v:2:y:2010:i:4:p:148-72
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/pol.2.4.148
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Andrei A. Levchenko, 2013. "International Trade and Institutional Change," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(5), pages 1145-1181, October.
    2. Gnangnon, Sèna Kimm, 2021. "Effect of Development Aid on Productive Capacities," EconStor Preprints 233973, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    3. Arghya Ghosh & Peter Robertson, 2012. "Trade and expropriation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 50(1), pages 169-191, May.
    4. Yang‐Ming Chang & Shih‐Jye Wu, 2020. "Insecure Resources, Bilateral Trade, and Endogenous Predation: A Game‐Theoretic Analysis of Conflict and Trade," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 86(4), pages 1338-1371, April.
    5. Vincenzo Bove & Leandro Elia & Petros G. Sekeris, 2014. "US Security Strategy and the Gains from Bilateral Trade," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(5), pages 863-885, November.
    6. Do, Quy-Toan & Levchenko, Andrei A., 2009. "Trade, inequality, and the political economy of institutions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1489-1520, July.
    7. Matteo Cervellati & Alireza Naghavi & Farid Toubal, 2018. "Trade liberalization, democratization, and technology adoption," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 145-173, June.
    8. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2011. "Appropriation, violent enforcement, and transaction costs: a critical survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(1), pages 227-253, April.
    9. Christodoulos Stefanadis, 2020. "Social conflict, property rights, and the capital–labor split," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(4), pages 582-604, October.
    10. Fischer-Thöne, Christian & Egger, Hartmut, 2021. "Institutional Reform and Global Value Chains," VfS Annual Conference 2021 (Virtual Conference): Climate Economics 242442, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    11. Saad, Ayhab F., 2021. "Institutional change in the global economy: How trade reform can be detrimental to welfare," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 97-110.
    12. Sebil Olalekan Oshota & Bashir Adelowo Wahab, 2022. "Institutional Quality and Intra-Regional Trade Flows: Evidence from ECOWAS," Journal of African Trade, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 73-106, December.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law

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