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An Insecure Economy under Ratio and Logistic Conflict Technologies

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  • Charles H. Anderton

    (Department of Economics, College of the Holy Cross)

Abstract

A model that integrates production, exchange, and conflict is used to theoretically investigate the economic behavior of groups that experience an erosion of security within a state. The focus of our investigation is the comparative effects of different conflict production functions (i.e., ratio and logistic) and parameters (i.e., weapons productivity, conflict decisiveness) on the predictions of the integrated economy model. The model shows how two major analytical categories of mainstream economics—production and exchange—can be a source of demand for arms as groups attempt to protect their economic opportunities in the face of intrastate insecurity. Conditions are also identified under which the gains from specialized production and exchange dampen the potential for conflict and hence serve as a form of conflict mitigation. Many of the results of the integrated model are shown to be quite sensitive to the technology of conflict.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles H. Anderton, 2000. "An Insecure Economy under Ratio and Logistic Conflict Technologies," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 44(6), pages 823-838, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:44:y:2000:i:6:p:823-838
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002700044006007
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Anderton, Charles H., 1999. "Appropriation possibilities in a simple exchange economy," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 77-83, April.
    2. Anderton, Charles H & Anderton, Roxane A & Carter, John R, 1999. "Economic Activity in the Shadow of Conflict," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 37(1), pages 166-179, January.
    3. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Theorizing about conflict," Handbook of Defense Economics, in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 165-189, Elsevier.
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    5. Garfinkel,Michelle R. & Skaperdas,Stergios (ed.), 1996. "The Political Economy of Conflict and Appropriation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521560634.
    6. Charles Anderton, 2000. "Exchange of goods or exchange of blows? New directions in conflict and exchange," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(1), pages 55-71.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dario Maimone Ansaldo Patti & Pietro Navarra & Giuseppe Sobbrio, 2022. "Insecure Property Rights and Conflicts: How to Solve Them?," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(1), pages 1-32, December.
    2. Hernando Zuleta & Juanita Villaveces, 2008. "Conflict and negotiation: a game theoretical approach," Documentos de Trabajo 5148, Universidad del Rosario.
    3. Raul Caruso, 2007. "Continuing Conflict and Stalemate: A note," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(17), pages 1-8.
    4. Clémence Vergne & Camille Laville, 2018. "Comment analyser le risque sociopolitique ? Une composante clé du risque-pays," Post-Print hal-02358975, HAL.
    5. Johannes Münster & Klaas Staal, 2011. "War with Outsiders Makes Peace Inside," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 28(2), pages 91-110, April.
    6. María Cubel & Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2014. "Difference-form group contests," Working Papers 2014/6, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    7. Todd Sandler, 2000. "Economic Analysis of Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 44(6), pages 723-729, December.
    8. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2007:i:17:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Vahabi,Mehrdad, 2019. "The Political Economy of Predation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107591370.
    10. Sakshi Gupta & Ram Singh, 2018. "On Existence and Properties of Pure-strategy Equilibria under Contests," Working papers 288, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    11. Raul Caruso, 2008. "Reciprocity in the shadow of threat," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 55(1), pages 91-111, April.
    12. Raul Caruso, 2006. "A Trade Institution as a Peaceful Institution? A Contribution to Integrative Theory," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 23(1), pages 53-72, February.
    13. Caruso Raul, 2006. "Conflict and Conflict Management with Interdependent Instruments and Asymmetric Stakes, (The Good-Cop and the Bad-Cop Game)," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-55, September.
    14. Raul Caruso, 2004. "A Trade Institution as a Peaceful Institution?," Others 0406003, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 02 May 2005.
    15. Paul Dunne & Maria del Carmen Garcia-Alonso & Paul Levine & Ron Smith, 2007. "Determining The Defence Industrial Base," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(3), pages 199-221.
    16. María Cubel & Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2014. "Difference-form group contests," Working Papers 2014/6, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    17. Martin C. McGuire, 2010. "Economic Analysis and International Security," Public Policy Review, Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance Japan, vol. 6(2), pages 313-346, March.

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