Defense Expenditure and Economic Growth under External Predation
This paper develops a growth model of a country under a Hobbesian environment with international conflicts where national defense is the only way to prevent external predation. The long run growth path is determined by the equilibrium of a dynamic game with three players, the external predator, the government and the family. The equilibrium growth path has three phases, submissive equilibrium, tolerant equilibrium and full-protected equilibrium. Different defense strategies result in different growth prospects and sustainable growth will endogenously induce adjustment of defense strategies.
|Date of creation:||07 Jan 2011|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Skaperdas, Stergios, 1996.
"Contest Success Functions,"
Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 283-90, February.
- Glenn C. Loury, 1979. "Market Structure and Innovation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 93(3), pages 395-410.
- Baik, Kyung Hwan, 1998. "Difference-form contest success functions and effort levels in contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 685-701, November.
- Garfinkel, Michelle R, 1990. "Arming as a Strategic Investment in a Cooperative Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 50-68, March.
- Jack Hirshleifer, 1989. "Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(2), pages 101-112, November.
- Dixit, Avinash K, 1987. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 891-98, December.
- Robert J. Barro & Xavier Sala-I-Martin, 1992.
"Public Finance in Models of Economic Growth,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 59(4), pages 645-661.
- Barro, Robert J. & Sala-i-Martin, Xavier, 1992. "Public Finance in Models of Economic Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 630, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Robert J. Barro & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 1990. "Public Finance in Models of Economic Growth," NBER Working Papers 3362, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sala-I-Martin, X. & Barro, R.J., 1991. "Public Finance in Models of Economic Growth," Papers 640, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
- Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-88, December.
- Baik, Kyung Hwan & Lee, Sanghack, 2001. "Strategic Groups and Rent Dissipation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 39(4), pages 672-84, October.
- Daniel Mejía & Carlos Esteban Posada, 2003.
"Capital Destruction, Optimal Defense and Economic Growth,"
BORRADORES DE ECONOMIA
002096, BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA.
- Daniel Mejía & Carlos Posada, . "Capital Destruction, Optimal Defense and Economic Growth," Borradores de Economia 257, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
- Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1996.
"Predation and Accumulation,"
Journal of Economic Growth,
Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 333-50, September.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, March.
- Appelbaum, Elie & Katz, Eliakim, 1987. "Seeking Rents by Setting Rents: The Political Economy of Rent Seeking," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(387), pages 685-99, September.
- Thompson, Earl A, 1974. "Taxation and National Defense," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(4), pages 755-82, July/Aug..
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:29286. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.