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Voting under the threat of secession: accommodation vs. repression

  • Vincent Anesi

    ()

    (University of Nottingham)

  • Philippe De Donder

    ()

    (Toulouse School of Economics)

We build a simple model of secession crises where a majority of voters may wish to accommodate the minority in order to prevent a secession attempt. We first show the existence of a majority voting equilibrium, where the median voter is decisive and most prefers a government’s type that is biased in favor of the minority. We then propose a measure of the secession risk at equilibrium and perform the comparative static analysis of the equilibrium policy location and of the secession risk with respect to several parameters: the cultural distinctiveness of the two regions, the relative weight attached by voters to economic (centripetal) -as opposed to (centrifugal) ideological- factors, the relative size of the minority region, the (exogenous) probability that a secession attempt is successful, and the intra-regional heterogeneity of preferences.

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File URL: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/aplicacio/fitxers/2011/12/Doc2011-40.pdf
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Paper provided by Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB) in its series Working Papers with number 2011/40.

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Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ieb:wpaper:2011/12/doc2011-40
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  1. Enrico Spolaore, 2010. "Federalism, Regional Redistribution and Country Stability," Chapters, in: The Political Economy of Inter-Regional Fiscal Flows, chapter 13 Edward Elgar.
  2. Alberto Alesina & Enrico Spolaore, 1995. "On the Number and Size of Nations," NBER Working Papers 5050, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Gradstein, Mark, 2004. "Political bargaining in a federation: Buchanan meets Coase," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(5), pages 983-999, October.
  4. Philippe De Donder & Michel Le Breton & Eugenio Peluso, 2012. "On the (sequential) majority choice of public good size and location," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 457-489, July.
  5. Dreze, Jacques & Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 2006. "Rawlsian Pricing of Access to Public Facilities: A Unidimensional Illustration," IDEI Working Papers 409, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  6. Haimanko, Ori & Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 2005. "Transfers in a polarized country: bridging the gap between efficiency and stability," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(7), pages 1277-1303, July.
  7. Massimo Morelli & Dominic Rohner, 2010. "Natural Resource Distribution and Multiple Forms of Civil War," Economics Working Papers ECO2010/33, European University Institute.
  8. Ori Haimanko & Michel Breton & Shlomo Weber, 2007. "The stability threshold and two facets of polarization," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 415-430, March.
  9. Bolton, Patrick & Roland, Gerard, 1997. "The Breakup of Nations: A Political Economy Analysis," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1057-90, November.
  10. Goyal, S. & Staal, K., 1999. "The political economy of regionalism," Econometric Institute Research Papers EI 9957-/A, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Erasmus School of Economics (ESE), Econometric Institute.
  11. Michele Ruta, 2005. "Economic Theories of Political (Dis)integration," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(1), pages 1-21, 02.
  12. Michel Le Breton & Shlomo Weber, 2003. "The Art of Making Everybody Happy: How to Prevent a Secession," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 50(3), pages 4.
  13. Gradstein, Mark, 2004. "Political Bargaining in a Federation: Buchanan meets Coase," CEPR Discussion Papers 4188, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  14. Olofsgard, Anders, 2003. "Incentives for secession in the presence of mobile ethnic groups," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(9-10), pages 2105-2128, September.
  15. Anders Olofsgârd, 2004. "Secessions and Political Extremism: Why Regional Referenda Do Not Solve the Problem," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(5), pages 805-832, 09.
  16. Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 2003. "The Art of Making Everybody Happy : How to Prevent a Secession," IDEI Working Papers 164, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
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