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The Power of a Coalition

Author

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  • Michael Maschler

    (Princeton University and The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

Abstract

If certain information is given about the "psychology" of the players who participate in an n-person cooperative game, concerning their bargaining abilities, their moral codes, their roles in the various coalitions and their a priori expectations, then it is possible to define a measure for the power of each coalition which, perhaps, is a better description of the game than the usual characteristic function. The required information, called the standard of fairness of the players is a Thrall partition function which satisfies certain requirements. Its determination is discussed both from an experimental and from a theoretical point of view. In terms of the power, every game becomes a constant-sum game. Applications to the von Neumann and Morgenstern solutions and to the bargaining set are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Maschler, 1963. "The Power of a Coalition," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 10(1), pages 8-29, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:10:y:1963:i:1:p:8-29
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.10.1.8
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. H. Andrew Michener & Daniel J. Myers, 1998. "Probabilistic Coalition Structure Theories," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 42(6), pages 830-860, December.
    2. Roger B. Myerson, 1978. "Conference Structures and Fair Allocation Rules," Discussion Papers 363, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    3. Kjell Hausken, 2020. "The Shapley value of coalitions to other coalitions," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 7(1), pages 1-10, December.
    4. Kim, Chulyoung & Kim, Sang-Hyun & Lee, Jinhyuk & Lee, Joosung, 2022. "Strategic alliances in a veto game: An experimental study," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    5. H. Andrew Michener & Kenneth Yuen, 1983. "A Test of M1(im) Bargaining Sets in Sidepayment Games," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 27(1), pages 109-135, March.
    6. Martin Shubik, 1988. "The Interaction of Implicit and Explicit Contracts in Repeated Agency," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 891, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    7. H. Michener & Daniel Myers, 1998. "An Empirical Comparison of Probabilistic Coalition Structure Theories in 3-Person Sidepayment Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 45(1), pages 37-82, August.
    8. H. Andrew Michener & Greg B. Macheel & Charles G. Depies & Chris A. Bowen, 1986. "Mollifier Representation in Non-Constant-Sum Games," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 30(2), pages 361-382, June.
    9. Michael Maschler, 2004. "Encouraging a coalition formation," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 56(1), pages 25-34, April.
    10. H. Andrew Michener & Melvin M. Sakurai & Kenneth Yuen & Thomas J. Kasen, 1979. "A Competitive Test of the M1 (i) and M1 (im) Bargaining Sets," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 23(1), pages 102-119, March.
    11. Michael Maschler, 2004. "Encouraging a Coalition Formation," Discussion Paper Series dp392, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    12. Gary Bolton & Jeannette Brosig-Koch, 2012. "How do coalitions get built? Evidence from an extensive form coalition game with and without communication," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(3), pages 623-649, August.

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