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The Interaction of Implicit and Explicit Contracts in Repeated Agency

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Abstract

This article deals with experimental games as they pertain to game theory. As such there is a natural distinction between experimentation with abstract games devoted to testing a specific hypothesis in game theory and games with a scenario from a discipline such as economics or political science where the game is presented in the context of some particular activity.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Shubik, 1988. "The Interaction of Implicit and Explicit Contracts in Repeated Agency," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 891, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    • Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:891
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    File URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d08/d0891.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Murnighan, J Keith & Roth, Alvin E & Schoumaker, Francoise, 1988. "Risk Aversion in Bargaining: An Experimental Study," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 101-124, March.
    5. Roth, Alvin E & Murnighan, J Keith, 1982. "The Role of Information in Bargaining: An Experimental Study," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1123-1142, September.
    6. Roth, Alvin E & Murnighan, J Keith & Schoumaker, Francoise, 1988. "The Deadline Effect in Bargaining: Some Experimental Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 806-823, September.
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    11. Roth,Alvin E. (ed.), 1988. "Laboratory Experimentation in Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521333924.
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    13. J. W. Friedman, 1969. "On Experimental Research in Oligopoly," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 36(4), pages 399-415.
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    18. A. C. Hoggatt, 1969. "Response of Paid Student Subjects to Differential Behaviour of Robots in Bifurcated Duopoly Games," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 36(4), pages 417-432.
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    Cited by:

    1. David G. Pearce, 1991. "Repeated Games: Cooperation and Rationality," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 983, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.

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