The Interaction of Implicit and Explicit Contracts in Repeated Agency
This article deals with experimental games as they pertain to game theory. As such there is a natural distinction between experimentation with abstract games devoted to testing a specific hypothesis in game theory and games with a scenario from a discipline such as economics or political science where the game is presented in the context of some particular activity.
|Date of creation:||Nov 1988|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Handbook of Game Theory, Vol. 3, 2001|
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