Classroom Games: A Prisoner's Dilemma
Game theory is often introduced in undergraduate courses in the context of a prisoner's dilemma paradigm, which illustrates the conflict between social incentives to cooperate and private incentives to defect. We present a very simple card game that efficiently involves a large number of students in a prisoner's dilemma. The extent of cooperation is affected by the payoff incentives and by the nature of repeated interaction. The exercise can be used to stimulate a discussion of a wide range of topics such as bankruptcy, quality standards, or price competition.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Roth, Alvin E, 1988. "Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: A Methodological Overview," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 98(393), pages 974-1031, December.
- Cooper, R. & DeJong, D.W. & Ross, T.W., 1992.
"Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma Games,"
36, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
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- Russell Cooper & Douglas V. DeJong & Thomas W. Ross, 1992. "Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma Games," Papers 0036, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
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