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Management of common pool resources in a nation-wide experiment

Author

Listed:
  • Jean-Christian Tisserand
  • Astrid Hopfensitz
  • Serge Blondel

    (GRANEM - Groupe de Recherche Angevin en Economie et Management - UA - Université d'Angers - AGROCAMPUS OUEST - Institut National de l'Horticulture et du Paysage)

  • Youenn Loheac
  • César Mantilla
  • Guillermo Mateu
  • Julie Rosaz
  • Anne Rozan
  • Marc Willinger
  • Angela Sutan

Abstract

Dilemmas related to the use of environmental resources concern diverse populations at local or global scales. Frequently, individuals are unable to visualize the consequences of their actions, where they belong in the decision-making line, and have no information about past choices or the time horizon. We design a new one-shot extraction game to capture these dynamic decisions. We present results from a nationwide common pool resource experiment, conducted simultaneously in eleven French cities, involving a total of 2813 participants. We examine, for the first time, the simultaneous impact of several variables on the amount of resource extracted: the local vs. the national scale of the resource, the size of the group (small vs. big), the low vs. high recovery rate of the resource, and the available information. We show that individuals significantly reduce extraction levels in local as compared to national level dilemmas and that providing recommendations on sustainable extraction amounts significantly improves the sustainability of the resource. Overall, women extract significantly less, but care more about preserving the local resource; older participants extract significantly more resources but extract less from the national resource. Our experiment also fulfills a science popularization pedagogical aim, which we discuss..
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Christian Tisserand & Astrid Hopfensitz & Serge Blondel & Youenn Loheac & César Mantilla & Guillermo Mateu & Julie Rosaz & Anne Rozan & Marc Willinger & Angela Sutan, 2022. "Management of common pool resources in a nation-wide experiment," Post-Print hal-04075051, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04075051
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2022.107566
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
    • Q23 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Forestry

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