Some Thoughts on the Minimax Principle
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- M. E. Salveson, 1956. "A Problem in Optimal Machine Loading," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 2(3), pages 232-260, April.
- M. Beckman & R. Muth, 1956. "An Inventory Policy for a Case of Lagged Delivery," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 2(2), pages 145-155, January.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Guillermo Owen, 2010. "Michael Maschler’s bibliography," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(1), pages 301-308, March.
- Frank Riedel & Linda Sass, 2014. "Ellsberg games," Theory and Decision, Springer, pages 469-509.
- Vitaly Pruzhansky, 2003. "Maximin Play in Two-Person Bimatrix Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-101/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Ismail M.S., 2014. "Maximin equilibrium," Research Memorandum 037, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
- Meir Pachter, 2017. "LQG Dynamic Games with a Control-Sharing Information Pattern," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 289-322, June.
- Kaneko, Mamoru, 1982. "Some remarks on the folk theorem in game theory," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, pages 281-290.
- John Hillas & Elon Kohlberg, 1996. "Foundations of Strategic Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9606002, EconWPA, revised 18 Sep 1996.
- Robert W. Rosenthal, 1976. "An Arbitration Model for Normal-Form Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 1(1), pages 82-88, February.
- Souza, Filipe & Rêgo, Leandro, 2012. "Collaborative Dominance: When Doing Unto Others As You Would Have Them Do Unto You Is Reasonable," MPRA Paper 43408, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Frank Riedel & Linda Sass, 2014.
Theory and Decision,
Springer, pages 469-509.
- Riedel, Frank & Sass, Linda, 2013. "Ellsberg Games," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 80012, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Vitaly Pruzhansky, 2004. "A Discussion of Maximin," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-028/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Buechel, Berno & Emrich, Eike & Pohlkamp, Stefanie, 2013. "Nobody's innocent: the role of customers in the doping dilemma," MPRA Paper 44627, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Florian Gauer & Christoph Kuzmics, 2016. "Cognitive Empathy in Conflict Situations," Graz Economics Papers 2016-02, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
- HHironori Otsubo, 2012. "Contests with Incumbency Advantages: An Experiment Investigation of the Effect of Limits on Spending Behavior and Outcome," Jena Economic Research Papers 2012-020, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
- Rapoport, Amnon & Amaldoss, Wilfred, 2000. "Mixed strategies and iterative elimination of strongly dominated strategies: an experimental investigation of states of knowledge," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(4), pages 483-521, August.
- Vitaly Pruzhansky, 2011. "Some interesting properties of maximin strategies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(2), pages 351-365, May.
- Gregory B. Pollock & Antonio Cabrales, 1998. "Weak and strong altruism in traitgGroups: Reproductive suicide, personal fitness and expected value," Economics Working Papers 316, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Jason Shachat & J. Todd Swarthout & Lijia Wei, 2011.
"Man versus Nash An experiment on the self-enforcing nature of mixed strategy equilibrium,"
1101, Xiamen Unversity, The Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics, Finance and Economics Experimental Laboratory, revised 21 Feb 2011.
- Jason Shachat & J. Todd Swarthouty & Lijia Wei, 2013. "Man Versus Nash: An Experiment on the Self-enforcing Nature of Mixed Strategy Equilibrium," WISE Working Papers 2013-10-14, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University.
- Vitaly Pruzhansky, 2013. "Maximin play in completely mixed strategic games," Theory and Decision, Springer, pages 543-561.
- Morgan, John & Sefton, Martin, 2002. "An Experimental Investigation of Unprofitable Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 123-146, July.
- Gauer, Florian & Kuzmics, Christoph, 2016. "Cognitive empathy in conflict situations," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 551, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
- Martin Shubik, 1988. "The Interaction of Implicit and Explicit Contracts in Repeated Agency," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 891, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- repec:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:666-673 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:18:y:1972:i:5-part-2:p:54-63. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mirko Janc). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/inforea.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.