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Reassignment-proof rules for land rental problems

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  • Valencia-Toledo, Alfredo
  • Vidal-Puga, Juan

Abstract

We consider land rental problems where there are several communities that can act as lessors and a single tenant who does not necessary need all the available land. A rule should determine which communities become lessors, how much land they rent and at which price. We present a complete characterization of the family of rules that satisfy reassignment-proofness by merging and spliting, apart from land monotonicity. We also define two parametric subfamilies. The first one is characterized by adding a property of weighted standard for two-person. The second one is characterized by adding consistency and continuity.

Suggested Citation

  • Valencia-Toledo, Alfredo & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2018. "Reassignment-proof rules for land rental problems," MPRA Paper 92133, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:92133
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    Cited by:

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    land rental; non-manipulability; reassignment-proofness; land monotonicity; consistency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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