On the Discrete Version of the Aumann-Shapley Cost-Sharing Method
Each agent in a finite set requests an integer quantity of an idiosyncratic good; the resulting total cost must be shared among the participating agents. The Aumann-Shapley prices are given by the Shapley value of the game where each unit of each good is regarded as a distinct player. The Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method charges to an agent the sum of the prices attached to the units she consumes. Copyright The Econometric Society 2005.
Volume (Year): 73 (2005)
Issue (Month): 5 (09)
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