IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/bie/wpaper/337.html

Egalitarianism in convex fuzzy games

Author

Listed:
  • Brânzei, Rodica

    (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

  • Dimitrov, Dinko

    (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

  • Tijs, Stef

    (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

Abstract

In this paper the egalitarian solution for convex cooperative fuzzy games is introduced.The classical Dutta-Ray algorithm for finding the constrained egalitarian solution for convex crisp games is adjusted to provide the egalitarian solution of a convex fuzzy game.This adjusted algorithm is also a finite algorithm, because the convexity of a fuzzy game implies in each step the existence of a maximal element which corresponds to a crisp coalition.For arbitrary fuzzy games the equal division core is introduced.It turns out that both the equal division core and the egalitariansolution of a convex fuzzy game coincide with the corresponding equal division core and the constrained egalitarian solution, respectively, of the related crisp game.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstrac
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Brânzei, Rodica & Dimitrov, Dinko & Tijs, Stef, 2017. "Egalitarianism in convex fuzzy games," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 337, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    • Handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:337
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2911424/2911425
    File Function: First Version, 2002
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Cori Vilella & Carles Rafels, 2015. "Proportional Share Analysis," Working Papers 218, Barcelona School of Economics.
    3. Carles Rafels & Cori Vilella, 2007. "Proportional share analysis," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 15(2), pages 341-354, December.
    4. Stef Tijs & Rodica Brânzei, 2004. "Various characterizations of convex fuzzy games," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 12(2), pages 399-408, December.
    5. Branzei, R. & Tijs, S. & Zarzuelo, J., 2009. "Convex multi-choice games: Characterizations and monotonic allocation schemes," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 198(2), pages 571-575, October.
    6. Yu-Hsien Liao, 2017. "Fuzzy games: a complement-consistent solution, axiomatizations and dynamic approaches," Fuzzy Optimization and Decision Making, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 257-268, September.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:337. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Bettina Weingarten (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/imbiede.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.