An axiomatic characterization of the strong constrained egalitarian solution
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- Llerena Garrés, Francesc & Vilella Bach, Misericòrdia, 2012. "An axiomatic characterization of the strong constrained egalitarian solution," Working Papers 2072/203157, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
- Jens Leth Hougaard & Lars Thorlund-Petersen & Bezalel Peleg, 2001. "On the set of Lorenz-maximal imputations in the core of a balanced game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 30(2), pages 147-165.
- Peleg, B, 1986. "On the Reduced Game Property and Its Converse," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 15(3), pages 187-200.
- Dutta, B, 1990. "The Egalitarian Solution and Reduced Game Properties in Convex Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 19(2), pages 153-169.
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- Klijn, Flip & Slikker, Marco & Tijs, Stef & Zarzuelo, Jose, 2000.
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- Francesc Llerena & Cori Vilella, 2015.
"The equity core and the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core,"
Mathematical Methods of Operations Research,
Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 81(2), pages 235-244, April.
- Llerena Garrés, Francesc & Vilella Bach, Misericòrdia, 2013. "The equity core and the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core," Working Papers 2072/212194, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
More about this item
KeywordsCooperative TU-game; strong constrained egalitarian solution; axiomatization.;
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
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