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Bargaining in River Basin Committees: Rules Versus Discretion

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  • Le Breton, Michel
  • Thomas, Alban
  • Zaporozhets, Vera

Abstract

In this paper, we introduce a game-theoretical non-cooperative model of bargaining to analyse project funding in the French river basin com- mittees. After sorting out some of the main theoretical predictions, we proceed with an empirical application to the subsidy policy of French Wa- ter Agencies. The theoretical model of bargaining is simulated for various risk preferences, and a reduced-form estimation of the distribution of sub- sidies is performed. We find some evidence in support of the predictions regarding the role of bargaining in decision-making for water management.

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Paper provided by Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) in its series TSE Working Papers with number 12-324.

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Date of creation: 18 Jul 2012
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Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:26055
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