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Apparentement incentives under the d’Hondt method

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  • Alexander Karpov

    (Associate Professor, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Visiting Associate Professor, Kyoto Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University(2014.5.1-2014.8.31))

Abstract

This paper provides an example of sole apparentement (coalition) that leads to unlimited seat losses. The necessary and sufficient condition of the lack of successful apparentements is discovered. A precise description of an apparentement-proof set is recognized. The probability of the lack of successful apparentement is evaluated. A game-theoretical approach for apparentement formation is applied.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander Karpov, 2014. "Apparentement incentives under the d’Hondt method," KIER Working Papers 896, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:kyo:wpaper:896
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    File URL: http://www.kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp/DP/DP896.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Jarosław Flis & Wojciech Słomczyński & Dariusz Stolicki, 2020. "Pot and ladle: a formula for estimating the distribution of seats under the Jefferson–D’Hondt method," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(1), pages 201-227, January.
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    4. Michel Le Breton & Karine Van Der Straeten, 2017. "Alliances Électorales et Gouvernementales : La Contribution de la Théorie des Jeux Coopératifs à la Science Politique," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 127(4), pages 637-736.
    5. Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin & Warut Suksompong & Steven Wijaya, 2025. "On Multi-Level Apportionment," Papers 2511.10000, arXiv.org.

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