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On the Effect of the Absorption Coefficient in a Differential Game of Pollution Control

Author

Listed:
  • Ekaterina Marova

    (Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes, St. Petersburg State University, 198504 St. Petersburg, Russia)

  • Ekaterina Gromova

    (Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes, St. Petersburg State University, 198504 St. Petersburg, Russia)

  • Polina Barsuk

    (Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes, St. Petersburg State University, 198504 St. Petersburg, Russia)

  • Anastasia Shagushina

    (EPAM Systems, Inc., 22/2 Zastavskaya St., MegaPark, 196084 Saint Petersburg, Russia)

Abstract

We consider various approaches for a characteristic function construction on the example of an n players differential game of pollution control with a prescribed duration. We explore the effect of the presence of an absorption coefficient in the game on characteristic functions. As an illustration, we consider a game in which the parameters are calculated based on the real ecological situation of the Irkutsk region. For this game, we compute a number of characteristic functions and compare their properties.

Suggested Citation

  • Ekaterina Marova & Ekaterina Gromova & Polina Barsuk & Anastasia Shagushina, 2020. "On the Effect of the Absorption Coefficient in a Differential Game of Pollution Control," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 8(6), pages 1-24, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jmathe:v:8:y:2020:i:6:p:961-:d:370469
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    2. Petrosjan, Leon & Zaccour, Georges, 2003. "Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 381-398, January.
    3. Vladimir V. Mazalov & Anna N. Rettieva, 2010. "Fish Wars With Many Players," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 12(04), pages 385-405.
    4. Winter, Eyal, 2002. "The shapley value," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 53, pages 2025-2054, Elsevier.
    5. Jana Hajduková, 2006. "Coalition Formation Games: A Survey," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 8(04), pages 613-641.
    6. Dockner,Engelbert J. & Jorgensen,Steffen & Long,Ngo Van & Sorger,Gerhard, 2000. "Differential Games in Economics and Management Science," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521637329, Enero-Abr.
    7. Dockner Engelbert J. & Van Long Ngo, 1993. "International Pollution Control: Cooperative versus Noncooperative Strategies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 13-29, July.
    8. Gromova, Ekaterina V. & Marova, Ekaterina V., 2018. "On the Characteristi Function Construction Technique in Differential Games with Prescribed and Random Duration," Conference Papers 10475, Graduate School of Management, St. Petersburg State University.
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