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Which Electoral Formula Is the Most Proportional? A New Look with New Evidence

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  • Benoit, Kenneth

Abstract

A ranking exists in electoral systems research of different electoral formulas—the mathematical functions governing the conversion of votes into legislative seats—in terms of both proportionality of seats and votes and favorability to the largest party. I reexamine this issue with new methods and new evidence, attempting to cross-validate previous rankings using a larger and more controlled data set and more precise parametric methods than have been applied previously. The results by and large confirm previous knowledge but also illuminate several important new facets obscured in previous investigations. For example, at common ranges of district magnitude (from 5 to 15 seats), it is shown that electoral formula may matter at least as much as district magnitude in shaping proportionality.

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  • Benoit, Kenneth, 2000. "Which Electoral Formula Is the Most Proportional? A New Look with New Evidence," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 8(4), pages 381-388, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:polals:v:8:y:2000:i:04:p:381-388_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Galina Borisyuk & Colin Rallings & Michael Thrasher, 2004. "Selecting Indexes of Electoral Proportionality: General Properties and Relationships," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 51-74, February.
    2. John E. Jackson & Jacek Klich & Krystyna Poznanska, 2001. "Economic Transition and Elections in Poland," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 391, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    3. Maria Rosaria Alfano & Anna Laura Baraldi & Erasmo Papagni, 2016. "Effect of the proportionality degree of electoral systems on corruption," Environment and Planning C, , vol. 34(8), pages 1895-1916, December.
    4. Frederic Udina & Pedro Delicado, 2005. "Estimating Parliamentary composition through electoral polls," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 168(2), pages 387-399, March.
    5. Konstantinos Matakos & Riikka Savolainen & Orestis Troumpounis & Janne Tukiainen & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2024. "Electoral Institutions and Intraparty Cohesion," Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(4), pages 883-916.
    6. Fiva, Jon H. & Izzo, Federica & Tukiainen, Janne, 2024. "The gatekeeper’s dilemma: Political selection or team effort," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 234(C).
    7. Rafael Hortala-Vallve & Jaakko Meriläinen & Janne Tukiainen, 2024. "Pre-electoral coalitions and the distribution of political power," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 198(1), pages 47-67, January.
    8. Balázs R Sziklai & Károly Héberger, 2020. "Apportionment and districting by Sum of Ranking Differences," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(3), pages 1-20, March.
    9. Alfano, Maria Rosaria & Baraldi, Anna Laura & Papagni, Erasmo, 2014. "Electoral Systems and Corruption: the Effect of the Proportionality Degree," MPRA Paper 53138, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 11 Nov 2013.
    10. Sebastian Maier & Petur Zachariassen & Martin Zachariasen, 2010. "Divisor-Based Biproportional Apportionment in Electoral Systems: A Real-Life Benchmark Study," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 56(2), pages 373-387, February.
    11. Jarosław Flis & Wojciech Słomczyński & Dariusz Stolicki, 2020. "Pot and ladle: a formula for estimating the distribution of seats under the Jefferson–D’Hondt method," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(1), pages 201-227, January.
    12. Karpov, Alexander, 2015. "Alliance incentives under the D’Hondt method," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 1-7.
    13. Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, 2011. "Election inversions, coalitions and proportional representation: Examples from Danish elections," MPRA Paper 35302, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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