Electoral Institutions and Intraparty Cohesion
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
References listed on IDEAS
- Helios Herrera & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Joseph C. McMurray, 2016. "The Marginal Voter's Curse," Working Papers 798, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- Peter Egger & Marko Koethenbuerger, 2010.
"Government Spending and Legislative Organization: Quasi-experimental Evidence from Germany,"
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics,
American Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 200-212, October.
- Peter Egger & Marko Koethenbuerger, 2010. "Government Spending and Legislative Organization: Quasi-experimental evidence from Germany," EPRU Working Paper Series 2010-09, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986.
"The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
- Oliver Hart & Sanford Grossman, 1985. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Working papers 372, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Grossman, Sanford J. & Hart, Oliver D., 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Scholarly Articles 3450060, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver, 1985. "The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers 70, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Severin Borenstein, 1991. "The Dominant-Firm Advantage in Multiproduct Industries: Evidence from the U. S. Airlines," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 106(4), pages 1237-1266.
- Benoit, Kenneth, 2000. "Which Electoral Formula Is the Most Proportional? A New Look with New Evidence," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 8(04), pages 381-388, July.
- Lyytikäinen, Teemu & Tukiainen, Janne, 2013. "Are Voters Rational?," Working Papers 50, VATT Institute for Economic Research.
- Hyytinen, Ari & Meriläinen, Jaakko & Saarimaa, Tuukka & Toivanen, Otto & Tukiainen, Janne, 2015. "Does Regression Discontinuity Design Work? Evidence from Random Election Outcomes," Working Papers 59, VATT Institute for Economic Research.
- Stefano Gagliarducci & Tommaso Nannicini, 2013.
"Do Better Paid Politicians Perform Better? Disentangling Incentives From Selection,"
Journal of the European Economic Association,
European Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 369-398, April.
- Stefano Gagliarducci & Tommaso Nannicini, 2008. "Do Better Paid Politicians Perform Better? Disentangling Incentives from Selection," Working Papers 346, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Stefano Gagliarducci & Tommaso Nannicini, 2010. "Do Better Paid Politicians Perform Better? Disentangling Incentives from Selection," CEIS Research Paper 162, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 28 May 2010.
- Gagliarducci, Stefano & Nannicini, Tommaso, 2009. "Do Better Paid Politicians Perform Better? Disentangling Incentives from Selection," IZA Discussion Papers 4400, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Meriläinen, Jaakko & Tukiainen, Janne, 2016. "Primary Effect in Open-List Elections," Working Papers 79, VATT Institute for Economic Research.
- Fujiwara, Thomas, 2011. "A Regression Discontinuity Test of Strategic Voting and Duverger's Law," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 6(3–4), pages 197-233, November.
More about this item
Keywordselectoral systems; ideological heterogeneity; party cohesion; policymotivated parties; proportional representation; regression discontinuity design; Local public finance and provision of public services; C21; C72; D02; D72;
- C21 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2018-07-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2018-07-23 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2018-07-23 (Positive Political Economics)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fer:wpaper:109. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Anita Niskanen). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/vatttfi.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.