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The best at the top? Candidate ranking strategies under closed list proportional representation

Author

Listed:
  • Crutzen, Benoît S. Y.
  • Konishi, Hideo
  • Sahuguet, Nicolas

Abstract

Under closed-list proportional representation, a party's electoral list determines the order in which legislative seats are allocated to candidates. When candidates differ in their ability, parties face a trade-off between competence and incentives. Ranking candidates in decreasing order of competence ensures that elected politicians are most competent. Yet, party lists create incentives for candidates that may lead parties not to place their best candidates at the top of the list. We examine this trade-off in a game-theoretical model in which parties rank their candidates on a list, candidates choose their campaign effort, and the election is a team contest for multiple prizes. We analyze how the candidates’ objectives, voters’ attention and media coverage, incumbency, the number of parties competing in the election, and the electoral environment influence how parties rank candidates.

Suggested Citation

  • Crutzen, Benoît S. Y. & Konishi, Hideo & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2024. "The best at the top? Candidate ranking strategies under closed list proportional representation," Political Science Research and Methods, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(4), pages 706-728, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:pscirm:v:12:y:2024:i:4:p:706-728_2
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    Cited by:

    1. Maria Arbatskaya & Hideo Konishi, 2025. "Disclosing Effort in Dynamic Team Contests With Effort Complementarity," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 27(5), October.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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