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The Desired Political Entropy

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  • Theil, Henri

Abstract

In an article published in the December 30, 1967 issue of the Dutch weekly magazine Vrij Nederland, Mr. Frans Grosfeld suggested the following modification of the procedure of parliamentary representation of political parties. Instead of the conventional method of allocating to each party a number of representatives proportional to the number of votes cast for the party, he proposed to allocate a number of representatives which is proportional to the square of the number of votes. Thus, when there are n parties and when p1, …, pn are the proportions of the total number of votes obtained by these parties, the idea is to allocate a fraction qi of the representatives to the ith party determined byMr. Grosfeld made this suggestion for the Dutch political system, because in his view n is so large and even the largest pi belongs to a minority party, so that on many occasions several months of negotiations were necessary to obtain a coalition cabinet of one form or another. By squaring the pi's one obtains much larger relative differences between the larger and the smaller parties, and one party or a pair of politically related parties then has a much better chance of obtaining a parliamentary majority. Also, the system (1.1) provides an incentive for parties to merge, which contributes to a reduction of the degree to which the country is politically divided. This system should be contrasted with another system which is applied on a rather large scale, viz., that of declining any seat to those parties whose pi is less than a pre-assigned fraction θ (for example, θ = .03).

Suggested Citation

  • Theil, Henri, 1969. "The Desired Political Entropy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(2), pages 521-525, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:63:y:1969:i:02:p:521-525_26
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    Cited by:

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    2. Ocaña, Francisco & Oñate, Pablo, 2011. "IndElec: A Software for Analyzing Party Systems and Electoral Systems," Journal of Statistical Software, Foundation for Open Access Statistics, vol. 42(i06).
    3. Dario Debowicz & Alejandro Saporiti & Yizhi Wang, 2021. "Redistribution, power sharing and inequality concern," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 57(2), pages 197-228, August.
    4. Rein Taagepera, 2001. "Party Size Baselines Imposed by Institutional Constraints," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 13(4), pages 331-354, October.
    5. Çağrı Levent Uslu, 2017. "Seat-vote elasticity and the provincial distribution of government spending in Turkey," Eurasian Economic Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 7(1), pages 49-67, April.
    6. Allen, Trevor J. & Taagepera, Rein, 2017. "Seat allocation in federal second chambers: Logical models in Canada and Germany," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 22-30.
    7. Konstantinos Matakos & Riikka Savolainen & Orestis Troumpounis & Janne Tukiainen & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2018. "Electoral Institutions and Intraparty Cohesion," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 09-2018, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
    8. Konstantinos Matakos & Orestis Troumpounis & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2015. "Turnout and Polarization Under Alternative Electoral Systems," Studies in Political Economy, in: Norman Schofield & Gonzalo Caballero (ed.), The Political Economy of Governance, edition 127, pages 335-362, Springer.
    9. Jörnsten, Kurt & Ubøe, Jan, 2005. "Efficient Statistical Equilibria in Markets," Discussion Papers 2005/2, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    10. Wenruo Lyu & Liang Zhao, 2023. "Axioms and Divisor Methods for a Generalized Apportionment Problem with Relative Equality," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(15), pages 1-13, July.
    11. Jörnsten, Kurt & Ubøe, Jan, 2010. "Quantification of preferences in markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 453-466, July.
    12. Pankaj C. Patel & Betty Conklin, 2009. "The Balancing Act: The Role of Transnational Habitus and Social Networks in Balancing Transnational Entrepreneurial Activities," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 33(5), pages 1045-1078, September.
    13. Rein Taagepera & James Lee Ray, 1977. "A Generalized Index of Concentration," Sociological Methods & Research, , vol. 5(3), pages 367-384, February.
    14. Rein Taagepera & Madeleine O. Hosli, 2006. "National Representation in International Organizations: The Seat Allocation Model Implicit in the European Union Council and Parliament," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 54(2), pages 370-398, June.
    15. Gang Liu & Fan Hu & Yixin Wang & Huimin Wang, 2019. "Assessment of Lexicographic Minimax Allocations of Blue and Green Water Footprints in the Yangtze River Economic Belt Based on Land, Population, and Economy," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 16(4), pages 1-21, February.
    16. Tom Van Puyenbroeck, 2008. "Proportional Representation, Gini Coefficients, and the Principle of Transfers," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 20(4), pages 498-526, October.
    17. Wada, Junichiro & Kamahara, Yuta, 2018. "Studying malapportionment using α-divergence," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 77-89.
    18. Alexander, Jeffrey & Nuchols, Beverly & Bloom, Joan & Lee, Shoou-Yih D., 1993. "Organizational Demography and Turnover: An Examination of Multiform and Non-Linear Heterogeneity," Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper Series qt1g50w5xm, Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley.
    19. Bol, Damien & Matakos, Konstantinos & Troumpounis, Orestis & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2019. "Electoral rules, strategic entry and polarization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 178(C).

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