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Alliances Electorales entre Deux Tours de Scrutin : Le Point de Vue de la Théorie des Jeux Coopératifs et une Application aux Elections Régionales de Mars 2010

  • Le Breton, Michel
  • Van Der Straeten, Karine
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    L’objet de cet article est d’examiner, à la lumière de deux solutions majeures de la théorie des jeux coopératifs, les coalitions/négociations électorales qui ont lieu dans le cas où le mode de scrutin est un scrutin proportionnel avec listes bloquées, prime au gagnant et comportant deux tours en l’absence de majorité absolue au premier tour. Cet environnement électoral décrit les élections des conseillers régionaux qui se sont tenues en France les 14 et 21 Mars 2010.

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    File URL: http://www.tse-fr.eu/images/doc/by/van_den_straeten/wp_tse_295.pdf
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    Paper provided by Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) in its series TSE Working Papers with number 12-295.

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    Date of creation: Apr 2012
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    Publication status: Published in Revue Économique, vol.�64, février 2013, p.�173-240.
    Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:25768
    Contact details of provider: Phone: (+33) 5 61 12 86 23
    Web page: http://www.tse-fr.eu/

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    1. Eraslan, Hulya, 2002. "Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn Model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 11-30, March.
    2. Michel Breton & Ignacio Ortuño-Ortin & Shlomo Weber, 2008. "Gamson’s law and hedonic games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 57-67, January.
    3. Martin J Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2009. "A Course in Game Theory," Levine's Bibliography 814577000000000225, UCLA Department of Economics.
    4. Serrano, Roberto, 1995. "Strategic bargaining, surplus sharing problems and the nucleolus," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 319-329.
    5. Serrano, Roberto, 1993. "Non-cooperative Implementation of the Nucleolus: The 3-Player Case," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 345-57.
    6. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1994. "Bargaining and value," Economics Working Papers 114, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Feb 1995.
    7. David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, . "Bidding For The Surplus: A Non-Cooperative Approach To The Shapley Value," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 461.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    8. Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Olivier Donni & Ivana Komunje, 2011. "Learning From a Piece of Pie," Discussion Papers 1011-05, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
    9. Montero, Maria, 2006. "Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 380-397, February.
    10. Schofield, Norman, 1982. "Bargaining set theory and stability in coalition governments," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 9-32, July.
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