IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Estimating Noncooperative and Cooperative Models of Bargaining: An Empirical Comparison

  • Masanori Mitsutsune

    ()

    (Tokyo Metropolitan Government)

  • Takanori Adachi

    ()

    (School of Economics, Nagoya University)

This paper examines the issue of model selection in studies of strategic situations. In particular, we compare estimation results from Adachi and Watanabe's (2008) noncooperative formulation of government formulation with those from two alternative cooperative formulations. Although the estimates of the ministerial ranking are similar, statistical testing suggests that Adachi and Watanabe's(2008) noncooperative formulation is best fitted to the observed data among the alternative models. This result implies that modeling the time structure in bargaining situations is crucially important at the risk of possibly misspecifying the details of the game.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp/DP/DP799.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research in its series KIER Working Papers with number 799.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: Dec 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:kyo:wpaper:799
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Yoshida-Honmachi, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8501

Phone: +81-75-753-7102
Fax: +81-75-753-7193
Web page: http://www.kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp/eng/index.html
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Bombardini, Matilde & Trebbi, Francesco, 2011. "Votes or money? Theory and evidence from the US Congress," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7), pages 587-611.
  2. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1994. "Bargaining and value," Economics Working Papers 114, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Feb 1995.
  3. Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, 2001. "Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262232197, December.
  4. Patrick Francois & Ilia Rainer & Francesco Trebbi, 2015. "How Is Power Shared in Africa?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 83, pages 465-503, 03.
  5. Yasutora Watanabe & Takanori Adachi, 2004. "Ministerial Weights and Government Formation: Estimation Using a Bargaining Model," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 742, Econometric Society.
  6. Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2011. "One-dimensional bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 526-543, June.
  7. Okada, Akira, 2007. "Coalitional Bargaining Games with Random Proposers: Theory and Application," Discussion Papers 2007-10, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  8. Tomohiko Kawamori, 2013. "Rejecter-proposer legislative bargaining with heterogeneous time and risk preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(1), pages 27-40, January.
  9. Miyakawa, Toshiji, 2008. "Note on the equal split solution in an n-person noncooperative bargaining game," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 281-291, May.
  10. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 252, David K. Levine.
  11. Xingwei Hu, 2006. "An Asymmetric Shapley–Shubik Power Index," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(2), pages 229-240, August.
  12. Laruelle, Annick & Valenciano, Federico, 2008. "Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 341-353, May.
  13. Britz, Volker & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2010. "Non-cooperative support for the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(5), pages 1951-1967, September.
  14. Vuong, Quang H, 1989. "Likelihood Ratio Tests for Model Selection and Non-nested Hypotheses," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(2), pages 307-33, March.
  15. Eraslan, Hulya, 2002. "Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn Model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 11-30, March.
  16. Okada, Akira, 2010. "The Nash bargaining solution in general n-person cooperative games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2356-2379, November.
  17. Merlo, Antonio, 1997. "Bargaining over Governments in a Stochastic Environment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 101-31, February.
  18. Ray, Debraj, 2007. "A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199207954, December.
  19. Merlo, Antonio & Wilson, Charles A, 1995. "A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(2), pages 371-99, March.
  20. Martin J Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2009. "A Course in Game Theory," Levine's Bibliography 814577000000000225, UCLA Department of Economics.
  21. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  22. McDonald, James B, 1984. "Some Generalized Functions for the Size Distribution of Income," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(3), pages 647-63, May.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kyo:wpaper:799. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ryo Okui)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.