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Portfolio Allocation as Leadership Strategy: Intraparty Bargaining in Japan

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  • Yoshikuni Ono

Abstract

How do the dynamics of portfolio allocation work within parties? While much of the existing literature focuses on portfolio allocation among parties in coalition governments, bargaining over cabinet portfolios also takes place within parties because many parties have internal divisions or factions that influence these decisions. By analyzing data on portfolio allocation in the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan from 1960 through 2007, this study demonstrates that, contrary to the proportionality proposition (Gamson's Law), substantial variance exists in allocation outcomes over time because party leaders allocate cabinet portfolios among factions as a means of preventing defections and challenges from their party's members. The resulting portfolio allocation reflects the bargaining dynamics within the party: I find that party leaders surrender more portfolios as they become more vulnerable to challenges posed by internal rivals.

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  • Yoshikuni Ono, 2012. "Portfolio Allocation as Leadership Strategy: Intraparty Bargaining in Japan," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 56(3), pages 553-567, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:56:y:2012:i:3:p:553-567
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00586.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Masanori Mitsutsune & Takanori Adachi, 2014. "Estimating noncooperative and cooperative models of bargaining: an empirical comparison," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 669-693, September.
    2. Gary W. Cox & Jon H. Fiva & Daniel M. Smith & Rune J. Sørensen, 2020. "Moral Hazard in Electoral Teams," CESifo Working Paper Series 8357, CESifo.
    3. Ghalke, Avinash & Sensarma, Rudra & Chakraborty, Sandip & Kakani, Ram Kumar, 2023. "Stock markets and economic uncertainty: Roles of legislative sessions and coalition strength," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    4. Cox, Gary W. & Fiva, Jon H. & Smith, Daniel M. & Sørensen, Rune J., 2021. "Moral hazard in electoral teams: List rank and campaign effort," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).

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