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The Allocation of Power in the Enlarged ECB Governing Council: An Assessment of the ECB Rotation Model

Author

Listed:
  • ANSGAR BELKE
  • BARBARA STYCZYNSKA

Abstract

This study analyses the allocation of power in the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) as it enlarges to accommodate new members of the economic and monetary union. For this purpose, two classical power indices that have their origin in solutions to co‐operative games are applied. First, an assessment is made of the effects of enlargement on the voting power of different subgroups of the Governing Council that arise in the wake of the continuous accession process. Second, a systematic comparison is carried out to the status quo rule (‘one member, one vote’) with respect to the voting power of the ECB Executive Board and to the representativeness of European monetary policy, along with the potential for its renationalization.

Suggested Citation

  • Ansgar Belke & Barbara Styczynska, 2006. "The Allocation of Power in the Enlarged ECB Governing Council: An Assessment of the ECB Rotation Model," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(5), pages 865-897, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:44:y:2006:i:5:p:865-897
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5965.2006.00666.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Ansgar Belke & Florian Verheyen, 2012. "Doomsday for the Euro Area: Causes, Variants and Consequences of Breakup," IJFS, MDPI, vol. 1(1), pages 1-15, July.
    2. Dmitri Blueschke & Reinhard Neck, 2018. "Game of Thrones: Accommodating Monetary Policies in a Monetary Union," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(1), pages 1-15, February.
    3. Ansgar Belke & Jens Klose, 2017. "Equilibrium Real Interest Rates and Secular Stagnation: An Empirical Analysis for Euro Area Member Countries," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(6), pages 1221-1238, November.
    4. Honorata Sosnowska, 2013. "Analysis of the voting method used in the European Central Bank," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, vol. 23(1), pages 75-86.
    5. Frey, Rainer, 2009. "The design of an asymmetric currency union with shock persistence and spillovers: Short-term versus medium-term," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 85-97, March.
    6. Agnès Bénassy‐Quéré & Edouard Turkisch, 2009. "The ECB Governing Council in an Enlarged Euro Area," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1), pages 25-53, January.
    7. Ansgar Belke, 2014. "Monetary dialogue 2009–2014: Looking backward, looking forward," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 49(4), pages 204-211, July.
    8. Klose, Jens, 2016. "Country differences in the ECB monetary reaction function," The Journal of Economic Asymmetries, Elsevier, vol. 14(PB), pages 157-167.
    9. Ansgar Belke & Barbara Schnurbein, 2012. "European monetary policy and the ECB rotation model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(1), pages 289-323, April.
    10. Belke, Ansgar, 2017. "Central bank communication: Managing expectations through the monetary dialogue," Ruhr Economic Papers 692, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    11. Ansgar Belke & Barbara von Schnurbein, 2010. "European Monetary Policy and the ECB Rotation Model: Voting Power of the Core versus the Periphery," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 983, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    12. Honorata Sosnowska, 2014. "Banzhaf value for games analyzing voting with rotation," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, vol. 24(4), pages 75-88.
    13. Klose, Jens, 2024. "Monetary policy rules and the ECB rotation model," The Journal of Economic Asymmetries, Elsevier, vol. 30(C).
    14. Ansgar Belke, 2014. "Monetary Dialogue 2009-2014 – Looking Backward, Looking Forward," Ruhr Economic Papers 0477, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    15. repec:bla:jcmkts:v:47:y:2009:i::p:25-53 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Andrzej Torój, 2009. "Solving Forward-Looking Models of Cross-Country Adjustment within the Euro Area," Central European Journal of Economic Modelling and Econometrics, Central European Journal of Economic Modelling and Econometrics, vol. 1(3), pages 211-241, November.
    17. Ansgar Belke & Barbara von Schnurbein, 2010. "European Monetary Policy and the ECB Rotation Model – Voting Power of the Core versus the Periphery," Ruhr Economic Papers 0175, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    18. Sascha Kurz & Nicola Maaser & Stefan Napel & Matthias Weber, 2014. "Mostly Sunny: A Forecast of Tomorrow's Power Index Research," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-058/I, Tinbergen Institute.

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