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Game of Thrones: Accommodating Monetary Policies in a Monetary Union

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  • Dmitri Blueschke

    (Department of Economics, Alpen-Adria-Universität Klagenfurt, 9020 Klagenfurt, Austria)

  • Reinhard Neck

    (Department of Economics, Alpen-Adria-Universität Klagenfurt, 9020 Klagenfurt, Austria)

Abstract

In this paper, we present an application of the dynamic tracking games framework to a monetary union. We use a small stylized nonlinear three-country macroeconomic model of a monetary union to analyze the interactions between fiscal (governments) and monetary (common central bank) policy makers, assuming different objective functions of these decision makers. Using the OPTGAME algorithm, we calculate solutions for several games: a noncooperative solution where each government and the central bank play against each other (a feedback Nash equilibrium solution), a fully-cooperative solution with all players following a joint course of action (a Pareto optimal solution) and three solutions where various coalitions (subsets of the players) play against coalitions of the other players in a noncooperative way. It turns out that the fully-cooperative solution yields the best results, the noncooperative solution fares worst and the coalition games lie in between, with a broad coalition of the fiscally more responsible countries and the central bank against the less thrifty countries coming closest to the Pareto optimum.

Suggested Citation

  • Dmitri Blueschke & Reinhard Neck, 2018. "Game of Thrones: Accommodating Monetary Policies in a Monetary Union," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(1), pages 1-15, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:9:y:2018:i:1:p:9-:d:132430
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Dmitri Blueschke & Viktoria Blueschke-Nikolaeva & Reinhard Neck, 2023. "Should fiscal policies be centralized in a monetary union? A dynamic game approach," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 31(4), pages 1129-1148, December.
    2. R. Neck & D. Blueschke, 2020. "Every Country for Itself and the Central Bank for Us All?," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 26(4), pages 377-389, November.

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