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One Emu Fiscal Policy For The Euro

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  • Cole, Alexandre Lucas
  • Guerello, Chiara
  • Traficante, Guido

Abstract

We build a two-country New-Keynesian DSGE model of a Currency Union to study the effects of fiscal policy coordination, by evaluating the stabilization properties and welfare implications of different fiscal policy scenarios. Our main findings are that a government spending rule which targets the net exports gap rather than the domestic output gap produces more stable dynamics and that consolidating government budget constraints across countries with symmetric tax rate movements provides greater stabilization. A key role is played by the trade elasticity which determines the impact of the terms of trade on net exports. In fact, when goods are complements, the stabilization properties of coordinating fiscal policies are no longer supported. These findings point out to possible policy prescriptions for the Euro Area: to coordinate fiscal policies by reducing international demand imbalances, either by stabilizing trade flows across countries or by creating some form of Fiscal Union or both.

Suggested Citation

  • Cole, Alexandre Lucas & Guerello, Chiara & Traficante, Guido, 2020. "One Emu Fiscal Policy For The Euro," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 24(6), pages 1437-1477, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:macdyn:v:24:y:2020:i:6:p:1437-1477_5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. One EMU Fiscal Policy for the EURO
      by Christian Zimmermann in NEP-DGE blog on 2019-12-23 18:47:15

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    1. Cole, Alexandre Lucas & Guerello, Chiara & Traficante, Guido, 2023. "Government debt deleveraging in the EMU," International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 296-324.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
    • F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
    • F45 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Macroeconomic Issues of Monetary Unions
    • E12 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - Keynes; Keynesian; Post-Keynesian; Modern Monetary Theory

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