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Macroeconomic Stabilization Policies In The Emu: Spillovers, Asymmetries And Institutions

Author

Listed:
  • Joseph Plasmans
  • Jacob Engwerda
  • Bas Van Aarle
  • Tomasz Michalak
  • Giovanni Di Bartolomeo

Abstract

This paper studies the institutional design of the coordination of macroeconomic stabilization policies within a monetary union in the framework of linear quadratic differential games. A central role in the analysis plays the partitioned game approach of the endogenous coalition formation literature. The specific policy recommendations in the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) context depend on the particular characteristics of the shocks and the economic structure. In the case of a common shock, fiscal coordination or full policy coordination is desirable. When anti‐symmetric shocks are considered, fiscal coordination improves the performance but full policy coordination does not produce further gains in policymakers' welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Joseph Plasmans & Jacob Engwerda & Bas Van Aarle & Tomasz Michalak & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2006. "Macroeconomic Stabilization Policies In The Emu: Spillovers, Asymmetries And Institutions," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 53(4), pages 461-484, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:53:y:2006:i:4:p:461-484
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9485.2006.00390.x
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    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9485.2006.00390.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Joseph Plasmans & Jacob Engwerda & Bas van Aarle & Giovanni di Bartolomeo & Tomasz Michalak, 2006. "Dynamic Modeling of Monetary and Fiscal Cooperation Among Nations," Dynamic Modeling and Econometrics in Economics and Finance, Springer, number 978-0-387-27931-2, December.
    2. MONTEFORTE Libero & SIVIERO Stefano, "undated". "Aggregate Vs. Disaggregate Euro-Area Macro-Modelling," EcoMod2003 330700105, EcoMod.
    3. Roel M. W. J. Beetsma & Xavier Debrun & Franc Klaassen, 2001. "Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in EMU Desirable?," IMF Working Papers 01/178, International Monetary Fund.
    4. John DiNardo & Mark P. Moore, 1999. "The Phillips Curve is Back? Using Panel Data to Analyze the Relationship Between Unemployment and Inflation in an Open Economy," NBER Working Papers 7328, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Smets, Frank, 2000. "What horizon for price stability," Working Paper Series 24, European Central Bank.
    6. Uhlig, H.F.H.V.S., 2002. "One Money, But Many Fiscal Policies in Europe : What are the Consequences?," Discussion Paper 2002-32, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    7. Hamid Faruqee & Douglas Laxton & Bart Turtelboom & Peter Isard & Eswar S Prasad, 1998. "Multimod Mark III; The Core Dynamic and Steady State Model," IMF Occasional Papers 164, International Monetary Fund.
    8. Kashyap, Anil K. & Mojon, Benoît & Terlizzese, Daniele & Backé, Peter, 2002. "Monetary Transmission in the Euro Area : Where Do We Stand?," Working Paper Series 114, European Central Bank.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Dmitri Blueschke & Reinhard Neck, 2018. "Game of Thrones: Accommodating Monetary Policies in a Monetary Union," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 9(1), pages 1-15, February.
    2. Jean-Sébastien Pentecôte & Marilyne Huchet, 2009. "Shock asymmetries and distance to the Euro Area," Post-Print hal-00730072, HAL.
    3. Chortareas, Georgios & Mavrodimitrakis, Christos, 2017. "Strategic fiscal policies and leadership in a monetary union," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 133-147.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • E17 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy

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