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Fiscal-monetary policy coordination and debt management: a two-stage analysis

  • Giovanni Di Bartolomeo

    ()

  • Debora Di Gioacchino

    ()

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10663-008-9077-0
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Empirica.

Volume (Year): 35 (2008)
Issue (Month): 4 (September)
Pages: 433-448

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Handle: RePEc:kap:empiri:v:35:y:2008:i:4:p:433-448
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100261

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  1. Hayo, Bernd & Hefeker, Carsten, 2002. "Reconsidering central bank independence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 653-674, November.
  2. Stephen J. Turnovsky & Tamer Basar & Vasco d'Orey, 1987. "Dynamic Strategic Monetary Policies and Coordination in Interdependent Economies," NBER Working Papers 2467, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March.
  4. Russell Cooper & Hubert Kempf, 2000. "Designing stabilization policy in a monetary union," Working Paper 0001, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  5. Berger, Helge & de Haan, Jakob & Eijffinger, Sylvester C W, 2001. " Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(1), pages 3-40, February.
  6. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2000. "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1127-1150, September.
  7. Reinhard Neck & Engelbert Dockner, 1995. "Commitment and coordination in a dynamic game model of international economic policy-making," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 5-28, January.
  8. Beetsma, Roel & Jensen, Henrik, 2002. "Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interactions in a Micro-Funded Model of a Monetary Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 3591, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Anton Muscatelli & Piergiovanna Natale & Patrizio Tirelli, 2003. "A Simple and Flexible Alternative to the Stability and Growth Pact Deficit Ceilings. Is it at hand?," CESifo Working Paper Series 1006, CESifo Group Munich.
  10. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1999. "A General Class of Adaptive Strategies," Game Theory and Information 9904001, EconWPA, revised 23 Mar 2000.
  11. Brociner, Andrew & Levine, Paul L, 1992. "Fiscal Policy Coordination and EMU: A Dynamic Game Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 639, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Forges, Francoise, 1990. "Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(2), pages 375-98, May.
  13. Ecchia, Giulio & Mariotti, Marco, 1998. "Coalition formation in international environmental agreements and the role of institutions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 573-582, May.
  14. Foster, Dean P. & Vohra, Rakesh V., 1997. "Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 40-55, October.
  15. Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 1998. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures," Working Papers 98-1, Brown University, Department of Economics, revised Jan 1998.
  16. Engwerda, J.C. & van Aarle, B. & Plasmans, J.E.J., 2002. "Cooperative and non-cooperative fiscal stabilization policies in the EMU," Other publications TiSEM 2cc19f3f-16ad-4fed-a701-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  17. Roel M. W. J. Beetsma & Xavier Debrun & Franc Klaassen, 2001. "Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in EMU Desirable?," IMF Working Papers 01/178, International Monetary Fund.
  18. Michael R. Darby, 1984. "Some pleasant monetarist arithmetic," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Spr.
  19. Woodford, Michael, 2001. "Fiscal Requirements for Price Stability," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 33(3), pages 669-728, August.
  20. Avinash Dixit & Luisa Lambertini, 2003. "Interactions of Commitment and Discretion in Monetary and Fiscal Policies," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 575, Boston College Department of Economics.
  21. Dixit, Avinash & Lambertini, Luisa, 2001. "Monetary-fiscal policy interactions and commitment versus discretion in a monetary union," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 977-987, May.
  22. Dixit, Avinash, 2000. "A Repeated Game Model of Monetary Union," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(466), pages 759-80, October.
  23. Thomas J. Sargent & Neil Wallace, 1981. "Some unpleasant monetarist arithmetic," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Fall.
  24. Moreno, Diego & Wooders, John, 1998. "An Experimental Study of Communication and Coordination in Noncooperative Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 47-76, July.
  25. Lehrer, Ehud, 1996. "Mediated Talk," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 177-88.
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