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Fiscal-monetary policy coordination and debt management: a two-stage analysis

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  • Giovanni Di Bartolomeo

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  • Debora Di Gioacchino

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Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Debora Di Gioacchino, 2008. "Fiscal-monetary policy coordination and debt management: a two-stage analysis," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 35(4), pages 433-448, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:empiri:v:35:y:2008:i:4:p:433-448 DOI: 10.1007/s10663-008-9077-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Roel M. W. J. Beetsma & Xavier Debrun & Franc Klaassen, 2001. "Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in EMU Desirable?," IMF Working Papers 01/178, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Levine, Paul & Brociner, Andrew, 1994. "Fiscal policy coordination and EMU : A dynamic game approach," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 18(3-4), pages 699-729.
    3. Beetsma, Roel M.W.J. & Jensen, Henrik, 2005. "Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a micro-founded model of a monetary union," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, pages 320-352.
    4. Thomas J. Sargent & Neil Wallace, 1981. "Some unpleasant monetarist arithmetic," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Fall.
    5. Lehrer, Ehud, 1996. "Mediated Talk," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 25(2), pages 177-188.
    6. Michael R. Darby, 1984. "Some pleasant monetarist arithmetic," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    7. Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, pages 67-96.
    8. Moreno, Diego & Wooders, John, 1998. "An Experimental Study of Communication and Coordination in Noncooperative Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 47-76, July.
    9. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2000. "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1127-1150, September.
    10. Russell Cooper & Hubert Kempf, 2000. "Designing Stabilization Policy in a Monetary Union," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0529, Econometric Society.
    11. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 2001. "A General Class of Adaptive Strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 26-54, May.
    12. Dixit, Avinash & Lambertini, Luisa, 2001. "Monetary-fiscal policy interactions and commitment versus discretion in a monetary union," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 977-987, May.
    13. Avinash Dixit & Luisa Lambertini, 2003. "Interactions of Commitment and Discretion in Monetary and Fiscal Policies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 1522-1542.
    14. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1999. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 286-336.
    15. Engwerda, Jacob C. & van Aarle, Bas & Plasmans, Joseph E. J., 2002. "Cooperative and non-cooperative fiscal stabilization policies in the EMU," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 451-481, March.
    16. Avinash Dixit & Luisa Lambertini, 2003. "Interactions of Commitment and Discretion in Monetary and Fiscal Policies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 1522-1542.
    17. Woodford, Michael, 2001. "Fiscal Requirements for Price Stability," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 33(3), pages 669-728, August.
    18. Anton Muscatelli & Piergiovanna Natale & Patrizio Tirelli, 2003. "A Simple and Flexible Alternative to the Stability and Growth Pact Deficit Ceilings. Is it at hand?," CESifo Working Paper Series 1006, CESifo Group Munich.
    19. Dixit, Avinash, 2000. "A Repeated Game Model of Monetary Union," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(466), pages 759-780, October.
    20. Foster, Dean P. & Vohra, Rakesh V., 1997. "Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 40-55, October.
    21. Berger, Helge & de Haan, Jakob & Eijffinger, Sylvester C W, 2001. " Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(1), pages 3-40, February.
    22. Turnovsky, Stephen J & Basar, Tamer & d'Orey, Vasco, 1988. "Dynamic Strategic Monetary Policies and Coordination in Interdependent Economies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 341-361.
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    24. Ecchia, Giulio & Mariotti, Marco, 1998. "Coalition formation in international environmental agreements and the role of institutions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 573-582, May.
    25. Reinhard Neck & Engelbert Dockner, 1995. "Commitment and coordination in a dynamic game model of international economic policy-making," Open Economies Review, Springer, pages 5-28.
    26. Hayo, Bernd & Hefeker, Carsten, 2002. "Reconsidering central bank independence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 653-674, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Engwerda, Jacob & van Aarle, Bas & Plasmans, Joseph & Weeren, Arie, 2013. "Debt stabilization games in the presence of risk premia," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 2525-2546.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monetary and fiscal policies; Debt; Differential games; Coordination; Correlated equilibrium; C73; E58; F33; F42;

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission

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