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Fiscal-Monetary Policy Coordination And Debt Management: A Two Stage Dynamic Analysis

Author

Listed:
  • Giovanni Di Bartolomeo

    (UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI ROMA “LA SAPIENZA”)

  • Debora Di Gioacchino

    (UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI ROMA “LA SAPIENZA”)

Abstract

This paper studies the interaction between two autonomous policymakers, the central bank and the government, in managing public debt as the result of a two-stage game. In the first stage the institutional regime is established. This determines the equilibrium solution to be applied in the second stage, in which a differential game is played between the two policymakers. It is shown that, if the policymakers can communicate before the game is played, (multiple-equilibrium) coordination problems can be solved by using the concept of correlated equilibrium. Unlike Nash equilibrium, which only allows for individualistic and independent behaviour, a correlated equilibrium allows for

Suggested Citation

  • Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Debora Di Gioacchino, 2005. "Fiscal-Monetary Policy Coordination And Debt Management: A Two Stage Dynamic Analysis," Macroeconomics 0504024, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0504024
    Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 30
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    monetary and fiscal policies; differential games; correlated equilibrium.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission

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