Monetary and fiscal policy design under EMU: a dynamic game approach
This paper analyzes the problem of designing macroeconomic stabilization policies within the European Monetary Union (EMU) as a dynamic game between a centralized monetary authority, the European Central Bank (ECB), and national fiscal policy makers. Non-cooperative feedback Nash equilibrium and cooperative Nash bargaining solutions are determined under various assumptions about r ationing regimes in goods and labor markets and structural characteristics of the economies involved.
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|Date of creation:||Dec 1999|
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- Reinhard Neck & Engelbert Dockner, 1995. "Commitment and coordination in a dynamic game model of international economic policy-making," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 5-28, January.
- Israel German, 1985. "Disequilibrium Dynamics and the Stability of Quasi Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(3), pages 571-596. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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