IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Macroeconomic Stabilization Policies in the EMU: Spillovers, Asymmetries, and Institutions

  • Giovanni Di Bartolomeo
  • Jacob Engwerda
  • Joseph Plasmans
  • Bas van Aarle
  • Tomasz Michalak

This paper studies the institutional design of the coordination of macroeconomic stabilization policies within a monetary union in the framework of linear quadratic differential games. A central role in the analysis plays the partitioned game approach of the endogenous coalition formation literature. The specific policy recommendations in the EMU context depend on the particular characteristics of the shocks and the economic structure. In the case of a common shock, fiscal coordination or full policy coordination is desirable. When asymmetric shocks are considered, fiscal coordination improves the performance but full policy coordination doesn’t produce further gains in policymakers’ welfare.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 1376.

in new window

Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1376
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Poschingerstrasse 5, 81679 Munich

Phone: +49 (89) 9224-0
Fax: +49 (89) 985369
Web page:

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Gottfried Haber & Reinhard Neck & Warwick McKibbin, 2002. "Global Implications of Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules in the EMU," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 363-379, October.
  2. Roel Beetsma & Xavier Debrun & Franc Klaassen, 2001. "Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in EMU Desirable?," IHEID Working Papers 04-2001, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
  3. Bas van Aarle & Jacob Engwerda & Joseph Plasmans, 2001. "Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction in the EMU: A Dynamic Game Approach," CESifo Working Paper Series 437, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. Richard Clarida & Jordi Gali & Mark Gertler, 1999. "The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective," NBER Working Papers 7147, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Jacob Engwerda & Joseph Plasmans & Bas van Aarle, 2003. "Staying Together or Breaking Apart: Policy-Makers’ Endogenous Coalitions Formation in the European Economic and Monetary Union," Macroeconomics 0301002, EconWPA.
  6. Mariotti, Marco, 1997. "A Model of Agreements in Strategic Form Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 196-217, May.
  7. Ecchia, Giulio & Mariotti, Marco, 1998. "Coalition formation in international environmental agreements and the role of institutions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 573-582, May.
  8. MONTEFORTE Libero & SIVIERO Stefano, . "Aggregate Vs. Disaggregate Euro-Area Macro-Modelling," EcoMod2003 330700105, EcoMod.
  9. André Sapir & Marco Buti, 1998. "Economic policy in EMU," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/8078, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  10. Engwerda, J.C., 1997. "Computational aspects of the open-loop Nash Equilibrium in linear quadratic games," Discussion Paper 1997-83, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  11. Engwerda, J.C. & van Aarle, B. & Plasmans, J.E.J., 2002. "Cooperative and non-cooperative fiscal stabilization policies in the EMU," Other publications TiSEM 2cc19f3f-16ad-4fed-a701-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  12. DiNardo, J. & Moore, M.P., 1999. "The Phillips Curve is Back? Using Panel Data to Analyze the Relationship Between Unemployment and Inflation in an Open Economy," Papers 99-00-04, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
  13. Mojon, Benoît & Kashyap, Anil K. & Angeloni, Ignazio & Terlizzese, Daniele, 2002. "Monetary Transmission in the Euro Area : Where Do We Stand?," Working Paper Series 0114, European Central Bank.
  14. Smets, Frank, 2000. "What horizon for price stability," Working Paper Series 0024, European Central Bank.
  15. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1998. "International Institutions and Environmental Policy: International environmental agreements: Incentives and political economy1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 561-572, May.
  16. Hamid Faruqee & Douglas Laxton & Bart Turtelboom & Peter Isard & Eswar S Prasad, 1998. "Multimod Mark III; The Core Dynamic and Steady State Model," IMF Occasional Papers 164, International Monetary Fund.
  17. Chwe Michael Suk-Young, 1994. "Farsighted Coalitional Stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 299-325, August.
  18. Peter Hooper & Karen H. Johnson & Jaime R. Marquez, 1998. "Trade elasticities for G-7 countries," International Finance Discussion Papers 609, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  19. Monfort, Alain & Renne, Jean-Paul & Rüffer, Rasmus & Vitale, Giovanni, 2003. "Is Economic Activity in the G7 Synchronized? Common Shocks versus Spillover Effects," CEPR Discussion Papers 4119, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  20. Bloch, Francis, 1996. "Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 90-123, May.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1376. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Klaus Wohlrabe)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.