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Macroeconomic Policy in a Heterogeneous Monetary Union

We use a two-country model with a central bank maximizing union-wide welfare and two fiscal authorities minimizing comparable, but slightly different country-wide losses. We analyze the rivalry between the three authorities in seven static games. Comparing a homogeneous with a heterogeneous monetary union, we find welfare losses to be significantly larger in the heterogeneous union. The best-performing scenarios are cooperation between all authorities and monetary leadership. Cooperation between the fiscal authorities is harmful to both the whole union’s and the country-specific welfare.

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File URL: https://www.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/mtec/cer-eth/cer-eth-dam/documents/working-papers/wp_07_67.pdf
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Paper provided by CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich in its series CER-ETH Economics working paper series with number 07/67.

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Length: 48 pages
Date of creation: May 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:eth:wpswif:07-67
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