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One Money, but Many Fiscal Policies in Europe: What Are the Consequences?

  • Uhlig, Harald

This Paper outlines some issues regarding the interaction of independent fiscal authorities and one central bank in the European monetary union. It points out the possibilities for coordination failures, ranging everywhere from potentially excessive deficits and free-riding problems to coordination failures in European fiscal or banking crises. As policy conclusions, some suggestions for institutional improvements are made. In particular, the Growth and Stability Pact needs strengthening rather than weakening. Furthermore, a solution for EMU-wide banking regulation needs to be found.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 3296.

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Date of creation: Apr 2002
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3296
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  38. Heinz Welsch, 2000. "Domestic Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union: What are the Spillovers?," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), Justus-Liebig University Giessen, Department of Statistics and Economics, vol. 220(3), pages 327-342.
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