On the desirability of fiscal constraints in a monetary union
The desirability of fiscal constraints in monetary unions depends critically on whether the monetary authority can commit to follow its policies. If it can commit, then debt constraints can only impose costs. If it cannot commit, then fiscal policy has a free-rider problem, and debt constraints may be desirable. This type of free-rider problem is new and arises only because of a time inconsistency problem.
|Date of creation:||2003|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (612) 204-5000
Web page: http://minneapolisfed.org/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Web: http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/ Email: |
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Buiter, Willem H. & Corsetti, Giancarlo & Roubini, Nouriel, 1992.
"`Excessive Deficits': Sense and Nonsense in the Treaty of Maastricht,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
750, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Buiter, W.H. & Corsetti, G. & Roubini, N., 1992. "Excessive Deficits: Sense and Nonsence in the Treaty of Maastricht," Papers 674, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
- Mariano Tommasi & Sebastian M. Saiegh & Pablo Sanguinetti, 2001.
"Fiscal Federalism in Argentina: Policies, Politics, and Institutional Reform,"
32, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised May 2001.
- Mariano Tommasi & Sebastian Saiegh & Pablo Sanguinetti, 2001. "Fiscal Federalism in Argentina: Policies, Politics, and Institutional Reform," JOURNAL OF LACEA ECONOMIA, LACEA - LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION.
- Sibert, Anne, 1992.
"Government finance in a common currency area,"
Journal of International Money and Finance,
Elsevier, vol. 11(6), pages 567-578, December.
- Juan Pablo Nicolini & Josefina Posadas & Juan Sanguinetti & Pablo Sanguinetti & Mariano Tommasi, 2002. "Decentralization, Fiscal Discipline in Sub-National Governments and the Bailout Problem: The Case of Argentina," Research Department Publications 3160, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
- Russell W. Cooper & Hubert Kempf., 2001. "Dollarization and the conquest of hyperinflation in divided societies," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Sum, pages 3-12.
- Uhlig, Harald, 2002. "One Money, but Many Fiscal Policies in Europe: What Are the Consequences?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3296, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- V.V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1989.
"International coordination of fiscal policy in limiting economies,"
121, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Chari, V V & Kehoe, Patrick J, 1990. "International Coordination of Fiscal Policy in Limiting Economies," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(3), pages 617-36, June.
- Beetsma, Roel & Uhlig, Harald, 1999. "An Analysis of the Stability and Growth Pact," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(458), pages 546-71, October.
- Stephen Ching & Michael B. Devereux, 2000.
"Mundell Revisited: A simple approach to the Costs and Benefits of a Single Currency Area,"
092000, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research.
- Stephen Ching & Michael B. Devereux, 2003. "Mundell Revisited: a Simple Approach to the Costs and Benefits of a Single Currency Area," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(4), pages 674-691, 09.
- von Hagen, Jurgen & Eichengreen, Barry, 1996. "Federalism, Fiscal Restraints, and European Monetary Union," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 134-38, May.
- Canzoneri, Matthew B. & Diba, Behzad T., 1991. "Fiscal deficits, financial integration, and a central bank for Europe," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 381-403, December.
- Dixit, Avinash & Lambertini, Luisa, 2001. "Monetary-fiscal policy interactions and commitment versus discretion in a monetary union," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 977-987, May.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedmsr:330. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Janelle Ruswick)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.